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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT -
AUR
An International
Newsletter, The Latest, Up-To-Date
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis and Commentary Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion, Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World ACTION UKRAINE REPORT - AUR - Number
875
Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor,
SigmaBleyzer
WASHINGTON, D.C., THURSDAY, OCTOBER
4, 2007
INDEX OF ARTICLES
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The president on Wednesday shocked many observers
By Conor Humphries, Agence France-Presse (AFP) Kiev, Ukraine, Thursday, October 4, 2007 2. UKRAINIAN ALLIANCE RESUMES ITS
FEUDING
By Peter Finn, Washington Post Foreign Service Washington, D.C., Thursday, October 4, 2007; Page A22 3. STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO ON ELECTION Press office of President Victor Yushchenko Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, October 3, 2007 4. YUSHCHENKO'S PARTY STILL PLANNING TO FORM COALITION WITH ORANGE REVOLUTION PARTNER TYMOSHENKO Associated Press, Kyiv, Ukraine, Thu, Oct 04 2007
5. GAZPROM SAYS IT HAS DEAL ON GAS WITH KIEV By Catherine Belton in Moscow and Roman Olearchyk in Kiev Financial Times, London, UK, Thu, October 4 2007 6. IN RUSSIA, POLITICS MEANS BUSINESS By Quentin Peel, Financial Times, London, UK, October 4 2007 7. BALMY EUROPE BREATHES EASIER OVER LATEST QUARREL Dispute between Ukraine and Russia over payments for gas By Ed Crooks Financial Times, London, UK, Thu, October 4 2007 8. GAZPROM THREATENS TO REDUCE SUPPLIES TO UKRAINE Analysis & Commentary: By Vladimir Socor Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 4, Issue 184 Jamestown Foundation, Wash D.C., Thu, October 4, 2007 9. GAZPROM PUTS ON DISPLAY OF POLITICAL MUSCLE By Catherine Belton, Neil Buckley, Roman Olearchyk and Stefan Wagstyl Financial Times, London, United Kingdom, Wed, October 3 2007 10. PUTIN'S POWER PLAY WITH DEMOCRACY Editorial: Financial Times, London, UK, Wed, October 3 2007 11. UKRAINE: FRACTURED ALLIES EDITORIAL: Financial Times, London, UK, Wed, October 3 2007 12. PUTIN THE GREAT Review and Outlook: The Wall Street Journal
New York, New York, Wednesday, October 3, 2007 13. ORANGE REVOLUTION -- RELOADED Commentary: By Taras Kuzio, The Wall Street Journal Online New York, New York, Tuesday, October 2, 2007 14. ORANGE UKRAINE Review & Outlook, The Wall Street Journal New York, New York, Tuesday, October 2, 2007 15. UKRAINE VOTE HARMS RUSSIA TIES By Marc Champion, The Wall Street Journal, New York, New York, Tue, October 2, 2007; Page A8 16. UKRAINIAN TWIST TO A RUSSIAN FABLE Letter-to-the-Editor: Mr Illya Rozenbaum, Brussels, Belgium Financial Times, London, UK, Wed October 3 2007 17. UKRAINE'S ELECTIONS Have investors got too used to political uncertainty in Ukraine? Commentary: Financial Times, London, UK, Tues, Oct 2 2007 18. IS UKRAINE MORE OF A DEMOCRACY THAN RUSSIA? Opinion & Analysis: Yevgeny Kozhokin for RIA RIA Novosti, Moscow, Russia, October 3, 2007 19. TYMOSHENKO BEST OPTION FOR
RUSSIAN-UKRAINE RELATIONS
RIA-Novosti, Moscow, Russia, Tuesday, October 2, 2007 20. COLOUR BLIND Editorial: The Guardian, London, UK, Tuesday October 2, 2007 21. A PALER SHADE OF
ORANGE
Ukrainians know very well their election has been hijacked again Commentary: By Adam Swain, The Guardian London, UK, Wednesday October 3, 2007 22. UK'S GUARDIAN NEWSPAPER'S DISTORTED
REPORTS
Letter-to-the-Editor: From Askold Krushelnycky, UK Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #875, Article 22 Washington, D.C. Thursday, October 4, 2007 23. UKRAINE CALLS ON U.N. TO DENOUNCE
1930s FAMINE
By Patrick Worsnip, Reuters, New York, NY, Wed, Oct 3, 2007 24. GORBACHEV WARNS RUSSIANS AGAINST RISE
OF STALINISM
By Dmitry Solovyov, Reuters, Wednesday, September 26, 2007 25. REMAKING HISTORY IN A KIEV
MUSEUM
By Dmitry Shlapentokh, The Moscow Times Moscow, Russia, Thursday, October 4, 2007. Issue 3757. Page 8. MASSACRE AT BABI YAR RAVINE
The Associated Press, Kiev, Ukraine, Saturday, September 29, 2007 27. NEW LIGHT SHED ON HOLOCAUST IN UKRAINE By Angela Charlton, Associated Press, Paris, France, Wed, Oct 3, 2007 By Laurence Lee, Al Jazeera, Doha - Qatar, Friday, Sep 28, 2007
29. UKRAINE'S SEVASTOPOL BRACES FOR EXIT
OF RUSSIAN FLEET
By Sebastian Alison, Bloomberg, Sevastopol, Ukraine, Sep 28, 2007 ======================================================== 1. UKRAINE PARTIES LAUNCH COALITION TALKS The president on Wednesday shocked many observers By Conor Humphries, Agence France-Presse (AFP) Kiev, Ukraine, Thursday, October 4, 2007 KIEV - Political parties in Ukraine began tense talks on Thursday after President Viktor Yushchenko called for a unity government following parliamentary polls that gave pro-Western forces a slim majority. Near final results gave a narrow lead to an alliance of Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party and the opposition Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, raising the possibility of a reunion of the team that lead the 2004 pro-democracy Orange Revolution.
The president on Wednesday shocked many observers in a national address by calling for coalition talks to also include the pro-Russian Regions
Party
led by Yushchenko's bitter rival, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. He later noted that Our Ukraine and the Tymoshenko bloc had won the votes to form a governing coalition but said that the Regions party should also
be
given senior posts. "If the results of the election give the democratic forces a majority -- and this is the case -- the relationship between the authorities and opposition should be constructive," Yushchenko said. "If for this we have to provide the opportunity for the opposition to work in relevant posts in parliament ... then we need to give them these posts," he added in comments that also referred to possible government posts. The Regions party quickly accepted the president's offer and has sent Our Ukraine a list of subjects for discussion, Anna German, a member of parliament for the party, said Thursday. Consultations between Our Ukraine and the Regions party were due to start Thursday, she said. But the party of fiery reformist Yulia Tymoshenko rejected the possibility of a coalition with the Regions party. A spokeswoman said it was already holding talks -- but only with Our Ukraine. A parliamentary deputy with Yushchenko's Our Ukraine, Yury Pavlenko, said Wednesday that the party had already decided to form a coalition government with Tymoshenko's bloc, Interfax reported. Yushchenko did not mention who he wanted as premier but aides, including a senior official in the presidential administration on Tuesday, made clear that he aims to change Yanukovych for Tymoshenko. She is popular among Ukrainian nationalists and those supporting efforts to wrest Ukraine from Russia's centuries-old dominance. However, expectations that she would become prime minister raised fears of difficult relations with Moscow -- an issue highlighted by threats of a new gas dispute this week between Russian giant Gazprom and Ukraine. Yushchenko and Tymoshenko shot to worldwide fame when they led the 2004 Orange Revolution to overturn a rigged presidential election victory
by
Yanukovych. Yushchenko won the fresh polls and launched a pro-Western administration. For the last 11 months, however, Yushchenko was forced to deal with his bitter rival Yanukovych as prime minister, a chaotic period that forced the calling of Sunday's early election -- the third national poll in as many years. The strong performance of Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc in Sunday's poll allowed a revival of her on-off alliance with Yushchenko.
With 99.93 percent of ballots counted, their Orange coalition had won just under 45 percent of the vote, while the Regions Party has 34.3 percent on its own. After the final count, votes for parties that do not pass a three-percent threshold for entering parliament will be divided up, giving the Orange coalition a majority. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring
Service]
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2. UKRAINIAN ALLIANCE RESUMES ITS FEUDING By Peter Finn, Washington Post Foreign Service Washington, D.C., Thursday, October 4, 2007; Page A22 MOSCOW, Oct. 3 -- The supposedly reconstituted alliance of the personalities who led Ukraine's Orange Revolution nearly three years ago seemed on the verge of securing a tiny majority in parliament Wednesday but quickly started feuding with each other. With 99.59 percent of the votes in Sunday's election counted, the party of former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko and another party allied with President Viktor Yushchenko had secured a total of 44.93 percent of the vote. If they formed a government, they would have a handful more seats than any other combination of parties in parliament. But the political squabbles that have dogged the two leaders' relations resurfaced as they argued over the merits of bringing their rival, outgoing prime minister Viktor Yanukovych, into a future government. Yanukovych's Party of Regions got 34.31 percent of the vote, the largest of any party. But even in combination with his Communist Party partners and another smaller group that might ally with him, he appears to have fallen just short of returning to power. In late 2004, Tymoshenko galvanized the crowds that ultimately forced a rerun of fraudulent presidential elections and secured victory for Yushchenko over his rival, the Russian-oriented Yanukovych. Western governments welcomed the change, but in ensuing years, they have expressed frustration over the Orange coalition's inability to remain united and establish a stable pro-Western government in the former Soviet republic. Yushchenko and Tymoshenko had a falling-out in 2005 when Yushchenko dismissed a government led by Tymoshenko because of fierce infighting, opening the way for Yanukovych to reemerge as prime minister after parliamentary elections in March 2006. The pair made a show of reconciling before Sunday's vote and had seemed set to form a government with her as prime minister. But on Wednesday, Yushchenko, who is backed by the Our Ukraine party, called on the three major parties to begin negotiations toward what is known in parliamentary systems as a "grand coalition," an alliance of all major parties in a legislature. "We cannot get real political stability unless the three main parties agree on how the coalition and the cabinet must be formed and what relations must be between the ruling coalition and the opposition," Yushchenko said in televised remarks. "We cannot let talks last long." Speaking in Berlin, Yushchenko said an "Orange coalition" with a slim majority will "not bring stability to the country," the Ukrainian newswire UNIAN reported. He said the opposition should be given some cabinet and parliamentary posts to ensure stability. Tymoshenko said in a statement on her Web site that sharing power with the Party of Regions was out of the question. Such a deal would force her into the opposition, she said. Yushchenko's declaration, while appearing to be the action of a president above partisan politics, may in fact be a negotiating gambit, analysts said. Tymoshenko, whose votes jumped dramatically in Sunday's election, is buoyant, and Yushchenko may wish to rein in her ambitions by holding out the prospect of an alliance with the Party of Regions. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/03/AR2007100302381.html ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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======================================================== 3. STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO ON ELECTION Press office of President Victor Yushchenko Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, October 3, 2007 Dear fellow citizens, Votes cast in Ukraine's snap parliamentary election have almost been counted. Of course, it will be possible to assess the election only after all the ballots have been counted. However, today we can speak about its preliminary results. According to preliminary assessments released by foreign observers, the September 30 poll in Ukraine was held mostly in line with the obligations assumed before the OSCE and the Council of Europe and other standards of democratic elections. I am convinced that democracy has won. Ukraine has won. I welcome the choice made by the Ukrainian people. I am conscious that the results of this election reflect their opinions and moods. I want to stress that we have no right to waste even one hour. I expect the Party of Regions, BYuT, Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense and the Lytvyn Bloc to demonstrate political wisdom and take steps aimed at consolidating Ukraine around national priorities. The political forces in the newly elected parliament must formulate a model of cooperation between government and opposition on the basis of their common Ukrainian agenda. I think a coalition that will soon be formed should: [1] adopt an economic program of the country's development, stop price hikes, equalize and optimize the incomes of the citizens through market means. A new government should demonstrate new quality of social policy in the country; [2] cancel legislative immunity and privileges; [3] draft and adopt next year's state budget and include the Ukrainian president's social initiatives in it. I will not consider a budget in which the money from the abolishment of the privileges will not be used to increase social benefits; [4] pass a package of anti-corruption bills and establish a national anti-corruption bureau. I stress that there will be one law for all; [5] ensure the country's energy security. I would also like to remind you that the detonator of the political crisis was 2004 political reform. So it will be difficult to preserve political stability without reforming the constitution, and so the year 2008 should be devoted to new constitutional process and to revising the constitution. This is the main - official - part of the statement I want to make before you. Now let me make a few comments. 99.25% of the ballots have been counted so far. Five political forces have made it to parliament: the Party of Regions, BYuT, Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense, the Lytvyn Bloc and the Communists. I have held political consultations with the political winners over the past two days and today I commission the Party of Regions, BYuT, Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense and the other winners to start preliminary political consultations to form a majority in Ukraine's parliament and form a Ukrainian government. I would like to emphasize that the Party of Regions, BYuT and Our Ukraine have garnered the support of 80% of voters over the past year and a half. This shows the exceptional responsibility these three political forces bear for stabilizing the political situation in Ukraine's parliament, the fundamental rules to form a majority and a government on its basis and the principles of relations between government and opposition. I am deeply convinced the premier's job, other governmental posts or posts in the Verkhovna Rada committees will not help stabilize the political situation. We will have true political stability when the three key players - the Party of Regions, BYuT and Our Ukraine - make compromises. So my key message to these political forces is that they must start political talks to formulate basic rules of forming a majority in Ukraine's parliament and Ukraine's government and building relations between those political forces that represent government and opposition. Holding consultations with the political leaders of the aforementioned and other parties, I am ready to act as guarantor of the fulfillment of all agreements that will be reached during their preliminary negotiations. I am convinced we have a wonderful chance today to review the mistakes of the past, form a dialogue involving the key political players and propose a model of political stability on the basis of the election results. I pursue one goal: Ukraine should emerge united after the election. The election must not split Ukraine. I want to call on my political colleagues not to be guided by personal visions and personal interests but to consolidate their cooperation around national priorities. You, esteemed colleagues, have received everything from the Ukrainian people today and the most important thing is a mandate to form Ukraine's government. Do not be guided by personal interests and... this will be the best present for the Ukrainian society. I am convinced Ukraine's political forces are facing a difficult challenge, given our recent history and other things that were lost in the past. But, on the other hand, I am optimistic and convinced that these election results will give us a chance, perhaps for the first time, to speak about the essence of political consensus and about a new political dialogue which will lead Ukraine to many years of political stability. Thank you for your attention. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- LINK: http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/data/1_19529.html ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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4. YUSHCHENKO'S PARTY STILL PLANNING TO FORM COALITION WITH ORANGE REVOLUTION PARTNER TYMOSHENKO Associated Press, Kyiv, Ukraine, Thu, Oct 04 2007
KYIV - Allies of Ukraine's President Viktor Yushchenko said Thursday, Oct. 4 their intention was still to form a coalition government with his Orange Revolution partner. A statement a day earlier from the president has raised questions about whether his party would stick to that course. In his remarks, Yushchenko called for cooperation with his main political rival, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. Yuiry Pavlkeno, a senior member of the pro-Yushchenko party, said the president's statement signaled only that he wanted better dialogue with his political opponents and did not call for forming a governing team with Yanukovych. After Sunday's parliamentary election, Yushchenko was expected to tap Yulia Tymoshenko, an important figure in the Orange Revolution that brought him to power three years ago, for the premiership. Near-final results showed Tymoshenko's bloc and the pro-presidential party had enough seats to forge a ruling coalition. The two parties had agreed earlier on forming a Cabinet and unseating Yanukovych, whose party won the most votes but lacks a strong enough partner to assemble a governing administration.
In his remarks Wednesday, Oct. 3, Yushchenko reached out to all three major political forces, urging them to exercise "political wisdom" and work
together for the sake of national unity and stability. "I have one goal: Ukraine must emerge united following the elections; there must not be two Ukraines," Yushchenko said in a televised speech. Speaking later in Berlin, Yushchenko suggested that if his party and Tymoshenko's bloc secure a majority in parliament, they should consider giving Yanukovych's forces Cabinet posts, the Interfax news agency reported. Yushchenko appeared to be concerned about the prospect of instability if the country - already polarized by regional, historical and linguistic divisions - is governed by one political side. But the statement opened the door to the kind of paralyzing standoff that led him to call the early elections. But Pavlenko said Thursday that the pro-Yushchenko party would make good on its agreement to form a coalition with Tymoshenko. "Our decision ... is
unchanged," he said, according to the party's website. Analysts said Yushchenko may be reluctant to invest too much power in Tymoshenko, a potential rival for the presidency in 2009. Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were the linchpins of the 2004 upheaval, when hundreds of thousands of people poured into the streets of Kyiv claiming fraud in the presidential election. Yanukovych was initially declared the winner, but Yushchenko won a new vote after a court threw out the initial results. He then named Tymoshenko his prime minister. He fired her after seven months; their bickering helped bring Yanukovych back to power as prime minister last year. Yanukovych, who was backed by Moscow in 2004, has taken a more neutral stance since then, pledging to integrate with the rest of Europe, but is still seen as more Russia-friendly. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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======================================================== 5. GAZPROM SAYS IT HAS DEAL ON GAS WITH KIEV By Catherine Belton in Moscow and Roman Olearchyk in Kiev Financial Times, London, UK, Thu, October 4 2007 Gazprom, the Russian state-controlled energy group, yesterday said it had secured an agreement from Ukraine's current government to pay $1.3bn (euro921m, £639m) in natural gas arrears by November 1, thus avoiding potential cuts in supplies. Dmitry Medvedev, the Gazprom chairman and Russia's first deputy prime minister, said that following talks with Yury Boiko, Ukraine's energy minister, "we have reached agreement to avoid such problems in the future". He added: "European consumers won't suffer. European consumers are in an absolutely comfortable situation." But despite his assurances, confusion remained about the exact nature of the agreement reached in Moscow, with analysts suggesting it might be only an initial step towards resolving a standoff that has rekindled fears over possible shortages in gas supplies to Europe. Nikolai Azarov, Ukraine's finance minister, disputed the size of the debt, while the question of who would lead future negotiations with Gazprom remained in doubt as talks over forming a new coalition government in Kiev following weekend elections looked set to drag on. President Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine went further: "The Ukrainian state and [the state gas distributor] Naftogaz Ukrainy have no debts to Gazprom." He also raised doubts about the timing of the dispute that erupted days after the elections. "I don't think that . . . this statement was formulated in such a way and at such a time so as to be constructive for our relations," he said. Even a spokesman for Gazprom later conceded it was too early to say a deal had been reached. "I would not say this is an agreement. The current [Ukrainian] government has said it will take control of the problem," said the spokesman, Sergei Kupriyanov. He added that the standoff would only be solved once payment had been made. Analysts said Mr Boiko's hasty departure to Moscow for talks looked like an attempt by the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovich, prime minister, to seize the initiative in the debt talks while back in Kiev his position appeared under threat following the elections in which his party failed to win a majority. "It seems Yanukovich is going to fight to the end," said Valery Nesterov from the Troika Dialog brokerage. Mr Yushchenko earlier this week looked poised to resurrect his partnership with opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko in forming a coalition that would have probably seen Ms Tymoshenko replace Mr Yanukovich as prime minister. Ms Tymoshenko has promised to clean up the involvement of intermediaries in the gas trade between Ukraine, Russia and Central Asia. The European Commission, which said it considered Gazprom a "reliable supplier", has invited Russia and Ukraine to talks in Brussels later this month about energy security. But yesterday Mr Yushchenko called, in a televised address to the nation, for Kiev's leading politicians to put differences aside in forming a coalition of "unity". Mr Yanukovich interpreted the president's words as a signal that he favoured a broad coalition government including his faction. Ms Tymoshenko's bloc, meanwhile, said they would not enter into a coalition with Mr Yanukovich's Regions party. Formal coalition talks are expected to start later this week. Ms Tymoshenko yesterday said the debt must be settled but also called for an investigation into how it had built up. "We will not leave Ukraine with such debts, not even for two months," she said. "We need to find out where this debt came from, where the money was divided, who made the decision not to pay Gazprom on time, and to take the money out of the shadow sector." ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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======================================================== 6. IN RUSSIA, POLITICS MEANS BUSINESS By Quentin Peel, Financial Times, London, UK, October 4 2007 All politics is business in Russia today, and all business is acutely political. There is no dividing line between the two. Gazprom, the giant state-controlled gas monopoly, is the perfect example. Take its dramatic announcement on Tuesday, warning gas customers in the European Union that a dispute over unpaid debts with Ukraine might force it to start reducing gas supplies to that country - the main transit route for Russian gas to central and western Europe. The statement came just as the counting of election votes seemed to indicate that the next Ukrainian government would be a pro-western coalition, to replace the outgoing Russia-friendly regime. "We are not dealing on behalf of the [Russian] government," a spokesman said. "This is a purely commercial issue. Gazprom is a commercially driven company." Another official admitted the company held off making any announcement during the election campaign for fear of being accused of political interference. Its very silence was political. If Gazprom wanted to be seen to be totally even-handed, it should have announced that Ukraine owed it more than $1bn (euro710m, £490m) in unpaid gas bills at the same time it accused neighbouring Belarus of owing $456m, says Christopher Granville, Russia analyst at Trusted Sources. That was at the end of July. Alexander Lukashenko, the Belarus president, rapidly paid up. But the timing might have been embarrassing for Viktor Yanukovich, the outgoing Ukrainian prime minister, two months before the poll. So Gazprom said nothing. Yet it is hard to fathom what purely political purpose is served by landing an incoming government in Kiev with such a hot potato. If anything, it seems likely to get anti-Moscow forces to close ranks. Given the bitter relations between Viktor Yushchenko, the president, and Yulia Tymoshenko, his erstwhile ally in the Orange Revolution, that would be no mean achievement. Let us assume for a moment that Gazprom was driven entirely by commercial motives. Any company would naturally want to collect a debt running at $1.3bn, by Gazprom's account. But who allowed it to reach such a huge amount, and why? The behaviour of the Russian supplier reminds one of the detested "gombeen man" in colonial Ireland, a sort of rural loan shark who allowed his customers to run up big debts at usurious interest rates, which could be paid off only by selling him their land. Gazprom has been trying to gain control of the pipelines through Belarus and Ukraine to western Europe. It has succeeded in taking 50 per cent ownership of the line through Belarus but has failed in Ukraine. Could that be the motive in allowing the debts to accumulate? The pipeline is on the books of Naftogaz Ukrainy, the state gas distributor whose financial plight is behind the non-payment of debt to its supplier Ukrgazenergo, which in turn owes RosUkrEnergo, which owes Gazprom. Naftogaz has to supply municipal heating and housing bodies that are themselves all but bankrupt, as well as individual consumers who are also unreliable in paying their bills. The Ukrainian parliament, however, passed a law last February forbidding the sale of the pipeline to any foreign buyer, precisely in order to prevent control passing to Gazprom. "They want to own the pipeline, but they know it is not going to happen," says Jonathan Stern of the Oxford Institute of
Energy Studies. Instead, they may be looking for stakes in other Ukrainian assets. Professor Stern admits Gazprom does not take any high-profile action "without the OK of the Kremlin" but also wonders if western Europe is not excessively suspicious of the company's motives. "When you call in your credit is a business question," he says. Some sort of deal seemed to have been reached yesterday, at least for the Ukrainian government to take responsibility for the debt. But the detail of any settlement is what matters. Gazprom's aim may be commercial: to grab control of a bit more of the Ukrainian economy. And that, of course, would be supremely political. So watch the small print. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ [return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service] ======================================================== 7. BALMY EUROPE BREATHES EASIER OVER LATEST QUARREL Dispute between Ukraine and Russia over payments for gas By Ed Crooks Financial Times, London, UK, Thu, October 4 2007 The dispute between Ukraine and Russia over gas supplies in the winter of 2005-06 was a wake-up call to European consumers that the energy supplies they took for granted could not always be relied on. The latest disagreement does not look like having the same shock value. Warm weather, high levels of gas storage in the European Union, and hopes that the dispute will soon be resolved are all encouraging expectations that the dispute will have no impact on European supplies. Gas prices in the EU have not so far been affected. But if the row were to drag on as the weather worsens, European consumers could feel the effects, with Italy the country most at risk. Gazprom, Russia's state-owned energy group, has been working hard to reduce its dependence on Ukraine as a transit country. For now, though, it retains its central strategic importance. About 80 per cent of Gazprom's exports to the EU pass through Ukraine. At the beginning of January 2006, when Gazprom restricted supplies to exert pressure in negotiations over how much Ukraine paid for its gas, the price soared in the UK, Europe's most liquid spot market. Later in the month, when strong demand in bitterly cold weather prompted Gazprom to impose further supply restrictions, there was chaos in other European markets, particularly Italy. On both occasions, Ukrainians were suspected of taking gas that was intended for EU markets. Gazprom insisted yesterday that European customers would not be hurt by any supply cuts imposed on Ukraine, but its reassurances were not entirely convincing. There is nothing Gazprom can do to guarantee that the gas will pass through. The weather reports are more comforting: temperatures across Europe are balmy, limiting the demand for gas. Strong supplies from Norway, boosted by the Ormen Lange field coming on stream, have helped gas stocks in storage build up to above normal levels. Gazprom itself has plenty of stored gas. Chris Weafer, chief strategist at Uralsib investment bank, said: "As last winter was much lighter than usual, [Gazprom] has a lot of gas already under the ground in eastern European countries beyond Ukraine." The country that may be most vulnerable is Italy, according to Louise Boddy of Heren Energy, the gas market analysts. One of its main gas storage sites has been restricted by failing to receive all the permits it needs from the government. "Italy could be in trouble if we have a very cold winter," Ms Boddy said. Gazprom's strategy is to reduce its reliance on transit countries even further. It has proposed two new pipelines - Nord Stream, which would run under the Baltic to Germany, and South Stream, under the Black Sea to Bulgaria and beyond - to deliver gas direct to EU markets. In 10 years' time, if there is a dispute between Ukraine and Russia, EU consumers may not notice at all. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring
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======================================================== NOTE: Send in a letter-to-the-editor today. Let us hear from you. ======================================================== 8. GAZPROM THREATENS TO REDUCE SUPPLIES TO UKRAINE ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Vladimir Socor Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 4, Issue 184 Jamestown Foundation, Wash D.C., Thu, October 4, 2007 On October 2 Gazprom warned Ukraine via mass media that it would reduce gas deliveries from November onward, unless Ukraine pays $1.3 billion worth of arrears to Gazprom. According to company spokesman Sergei Kupriyanov, these arrears accumulated for gas supplied during the nine months since January 1, 2007. The timing of Gazprom's warning seems designed for leverage on Ukraine's political situation after the September 30 parliamentary elections. Characteristically, Gazprom resorted to the media weapon before informing the Ukrainian government or presidency. Kyiv had not yet been officially notified by October 3, when Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych dispatched Fuel and Energy Minister Yuriy Boyko to Moscow for emergency talks with Gazprom. There they agreed that Ukraine would pay those arrears until November 1 to avoid a cut in supplies. Whether Kyiv can pay that cash amount by that date seems doubtful. This situation reactivates a threat to Ukrainian ownership of the gas-transit network. The accumulation of Ukrainian debts to Gazprom in 2007 was predictable early in the year (see EDM, February 7, 21, 28). Indeed, Gazprom with its middleman firms and elements in the Ukrainian government had set up a mechanism for debt-accumulation through the January 4 and February 2, 2006, gas supply agreements. That mechanism has pushed the state company Naftohaz Ukrainy toward de facto insolvency in 2006-2007, leaving it open to Russian demands for joint
control of the gas transit system in lieu of debt repayment. That mechanism has operated from 2006 to date essentially as follows. Gazprom, monopoly buyer of Turkmen gas for Ukraine, sells those volumes -- along with some additional Russian-produced volumes -- to Gazprom's proxy RosUkrEnergo, the monopoly intermediary between Gazprom and Ukraine. RosUkrEnergo is a parity joint venture of Gazprom with two allied Ukrainian businessmen, the notorious Dmytro Firtash being a key figure. RosUkrEnergo sells that gas at the Ukrainian border to its proxy within Ukraine, UkrGazEnergo, a parity joint venture of RosUkrEnergo with Gazprom-friendly elements in Naftohaz and other Ukrainian offices. UkrGazEnergo has been awarded the lucrative Ukrainian market of industrial consumers of gas, whereas Naftohaz itself has been left with the barely solvent or insolvent "social market" for gas -- that is, mainly municipal utilities and the residential consumers -- where gas prices are regulated below the actual costs. These arrangements have drastically cut Naftohaz's income while enriching Gazprom's proxies in Ukraine. Moreover, transit and storage service fees for Russian gas passing through Ukraine westward were fixed at deeply discounted levels by the 2006 agreements, thus cutting Naftohaz's income even further. Last year already, the company was no longer in a position to carry out necessary modernization work. It then went into debt -- to Gazprom-friendly banks to be sure -- in order to refinance its arrears to Gazprom. The $1.3 billion now claimed by Gazprom comes on top of the 2006 debts, by Gazprom's reckoning. At present, Gazprom is farcically turning to RosUkrEnergo to pay that amount; RosUkrEnergo equally farcically points a finger to UkrGazEnergo to pay; and UkrGazEnergo claims that Naftohaz Ukrainy is the ultimate debtor, which is actually the result that the Kremlin-driven 2006 arrangements were designed to achieve. In the international debate that is now developing over this situation, Gazprom -- and behind it the Kremlin -- will undoubtedly portray their debt-collection claims as market-determined, and any dispute as purely commercial. The background to this situation should disprove that pretense, however. The political link is also apparent between Gazprom's sudden announcement and the outcome of Ukraine's September 30 parliamentary elections. Russia's ambassador to Ukraine -- and former Gazprom chief -- Viktor Chernomyrdin warned during a Kyiv conference on September 27 that talks were ongoing on the gas price and "everything will depend on who will come into the Ukrainian government" after the elections. Alluding to debt settlement, he served notice that joint control of Ukraine's gas transit system is more in Ukraine's than in Russia's interest; that it is "first of all a matter of state interest"; and that, should Ukraine decline to settle the debts by sharing control of transit pipelines, Russia would switch its gas export routes to seabed pipelines [i.e., Baltic and Black Sea], leaving Ukraine "with scrap metal: there will be the pipeline, but what will it carry?" (Channel Five TV [Kyiv], UCIPP Ukraine Monitoring, Interfax-Ukraine, September 27). While this latter part of the warning involves an element of bluff, the state-driven policy approach can hardly be clearer. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Naryshkin also unveiled a Kremlin-driven approach when discussing gas deliveries to Gazprom by Turkmenistan on October 3 in Ashgabat. Naryshkin "drew attention to the order given by the Presidents of both countries, to Russian companies first of all, to carry out active work" on that issue (Interfax, October 3). In light of Chernomyrdin's warning, it seems that Gazprom's sudden debt-collection demand represents an instant response to the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc's electoral success and the prospect of her playing a leading role in the Ukrainian government During her two years in the opposition, Tymoshenko has vowed to clean up the gas business in Ukraine. She is seen as a threat to Gazprom's and RosUkrEnergo's interests, and she is also as a major obstacle to any handover of control on Ukraine's gas transit system to Russia. Earlier this year Tymoshenko shepherded through parliament legislation that bars such handovers (see EDM, February 7); but elements in the government such as Boyko make no secret of their search for ways to circumvent that legislation. Negotiations over the price for gas supplies in 2008 are now starting in earnest and may complicate the situation even further. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ (Interfax-Ukraine, UNIAN, October 2-4) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service] ========================================================
9. GAZPROM PUTS ON DISPLAY OF POLITICAL MUSCLE By Catherine Belton, Neil Buckley, Roman Olearchyk and Stefan Wagstyl Financial Times, London, United Kingdom, Wed, October 3 2007 Gazprom likes to present itself as a purely commercial company. But yesterday the Russian state-controlled gas group gave a spectacular demonstration of its political clout. Its decision to threaten to cut supplies to Ukraine just as pro-western parties were poised to win power in Kiev struck observers outside Russia as clearly political. The group, which has close links to the Kremlin, could have made its announcement about pursuing its $1.3bn (£637m, euro918m) debt a week or two before or well after the poll. But it came just as it became clear that Viktor Yanukovich, the Russia-friendly prime minister, appeared to face defeat in the polls and could be replaced by Yulia Tymoshenko, the fiery opposition leader, who has repeatedly attacked the non-transparent arrangements surrounding the Russia-Ukraine gas trade. "This is a welcome mat for Tymoshenko ahead of her return as premier," said one Ukrainian official speaking on condition of anonymity. A spokesman for Andris Piebalgs, European Union energy commissioner, urged the two sides to find a solution. While the news caused consternation in Europe, it could help Ukraine by fuelling the European Commission's campaign for greater solidarity among the continent's gas buyers. The move will do nothing to improve Gazprom's hopes of securing wider access to the EU, as one of the main concerns of its EU-based critics is about political influence at Gazprom. Gazprom yesterday denied playing politics. "We tried not to push this issue during the Ukrainian election, otherwise there would have been the immediate accusation that Gazprom is using this as an attempt to influence the outcome of elections," said an official from Gazprom's export arm. "But with autumn approaching we need to settle all the issues related to non-payments. There is never a good time." However, industry analysts in Moscow said the timing smacked of a political warning for Kiev just as it looked as if the western-leaning coalition of Ms Tymoshenko and President Viktor Yushchenko were about to return to power. "This statement is connected to the results of parliamentary elections and the upcoming change of government," said Valery Nesterov at Moscow brokerage Troika Dialog. "Yulia Tymoshenko almost immediately brought up the problem of gas supplies . . . It comes just as it looks that Russia will have to start up negotiations over supplies with Ukraine from a clean slate and as doubts appeared that the current arrangement could continue." Ms Tymoshenko has pledged to clean up the "corrupt" multi-billion dollar natural gas trade between Ukraine, Moscow and Turkmenistan. She blamed the preceding government of Mr Yanukovich for the debt. "We now see how dishonest Yanukovich's government was," she said. "We will do everything necessary to ensure there will be no gas cut-offs. But let it be known, that the politics of Yanukovich led to such hazards." Ukraine's domestic gas monopoly Naftogaz Ukrainy has been under financial stress as it struggles to cope with Russian gas price increases and competition from Gazprom affiliates. Gazprom raised prices in early 2006 after a stand-off in which it cut off gas supplies to Ukraine and imposed a further increase in January 2007. Ukraine, which pumps the lion's share of gas to Europe, now pays $130 per thousand cubic metres. But Gazprom intends to raise prices from the start of next year. Gazprom supplies Ukraine through a Swiss-based trader called Rosukrenergo, half-owned by Gazprom. Rosukrenergo said yesterday the $1.3bn debt was owed to it by a distribution company, Ukrgazenergo, making it unclear what role Gazprom had in the debt negotiations. Ukrgazenergo is jointly owned by Rosukrenergo and Naftogaz Ukrainy. Jonathan Stern from the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies said he suspected Gazprom had stepped in to prevent Rosukrenergo from becoming insolvent. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Reporting by Stefan Wagstyl in Budapest, Roman Olearchyk in Kiev, and Catherine Belton and Neil Buckley in Moscow. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4b9909e4-714c-11dc-98fc-0000779fd2ac.html -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service] ======================================================== 10. PUTIN'S POWER PLAY WITH DEMOCRACY EDITORIAL: Financial Times, London, UK, Wed, October 3 2007 President Vladimir Putin keeps the surprises coming. Last month he suddenly promoted a grey apparatchik, Viktor Zubkov, to prime minister. Now he says he will head the parliamentary list of United Russia, the main pro-Kremlin party, in elections this December, and that he may even become prime minister himself after he leaves the presidency next March. He thereby gives every appearance of wanting to use the machinery of democracy to consolidate his near-total dominance of Russian politics. That will be a neat trick - if it works. The Zubkov appointment wrongfooted neo-Kremlinologists, who then concluded Mr Putin must be lining up this former courtier from the Russian leader's St Petersburg days as a temporary stand-in as president before Mr Putin himself returned to the top job. Apparently not. It is beginning to look as though the master of the Kremlin not only wants to observe the constitutional niceties preventing him from standing for a third term as president, but to change the structure of Russian power. That structure has always had a clearly dominant figure and, if Mr Putin pursues what he calls his "entirely realistic" idea, it means the powers of Russia's prime minister will have to be enhanced at the expense of the presidency. President Putin commands the support of a good 70 per cent of Russians and he could probably lift the numbers of United Russia to the two-thirds majority in the Duma needed to change the constitution and redistribute power. Under that scenario, United Russia, hitherto an ideas-free Putin vehicle, would transmute into a ruling party with long-term tenure - not so much a Communist-style one-party set-up as like an Institutional Revolutionary party, which ruled Mexico for most of the last century. If Mr Putin intends to run things - and clearly, he does - then it is arguably better that he rules through institutions than from behind the scenes as, say, head of an arm of the state such as Gazprom. Yet even for someone so clearly in control, it is not easy to rejig the sources of real power. This transition is not over yet. Addressing his United Russia followers on Monday, Mr Putin reminded them how he had pulled Russia out of the shambles of the post-Soviet 1990s and restored its pride and place in the world (where its belligerent swagger was again on show yesterday with Gazprom's threat to cut off gas to Ukraine). With this formally democratic power play, Mr Putin is signalling he still craves legitimacy for himself and Russia's political system. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d53e8bc4-714c-11dc-98fc-0000779fd2ac.html -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service] ======================================================== 11. UKRAINE:
FRACTURED ALLIES
EDITORIAL: Financial Times, London, UK, Wed, October 3 2007 Even before the dust had settled in Ukraine's parliamentary election, Russia's mighty Gazprom gave notice of its intent to demand payment of its outstanding gas bills from any new government. It held back from an earlier announcement that might have embarrassed the outgoing Russia-friendly prime minister, Viktor Yanukovich. It will have no such scruples now. Voters have, by a narrow margin, given their backing to the pro-western parties headed by Viktor Yushchenko, the state president, and Yulia Tymoshenko, the opposition leader, former allies who led the 2004 Orange revolution. That much is clear. What is less clear is whether Mr Yushchenko and Ms Tymoshenko will now be able to capitalise on their success. The two leaders loathe each other. The fragile alliance they struck in 2004 survived only a few months until disputes drove the president to sack his prime minister. Then, Mr Yushchenko was the dominant partner. Now it is Ms Tymoshenko who has the political initiative, after her BYuT bloc won more than double the votes of the president's Our Ukraine grouping. Coalition negotiations will be very delicate. But both must try to find a modus vivendi. They could appoint a technocrat as prime minister to mediate. Whatever they do, they should put their country before their egos. There is much they agree on - including bringing Ukraine closer to the European Union, integrating the country into the world economy, reducing dependence on Russia and ensuring poor Ukrainians share in the nation's growing prosperity. Yet the two leaders face formid-able difficulties. Mr Yanukovich's Regions party remains the largest parliamentary group. It speaks for eastern Ukraine, the country's richest region. It is backed by business people such as Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine's wealthiest billionaire. The new government must not alienate the powerful east. Indeed, it must deal with the economic power of oligarchs. To confront them would be to risk destabilising the country. Ms Tymoshenko, who has previously launched populist assaults on big business, must swallow her pride and follow Mr Yushchenko's conciliatory line. The oligarchs want global integration as much as the government. Even more difficult may be dealing with Russia, as Gazprom's instant demands demonstrate. Moscow cannot have a veto on Kiev's decisions. But Ukraine must pay its energy bills to guarantee its independence. Whoever is prime minister must learn to reconcile east and west. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0477509c-714d-11dc-98fc-0000779fd2ac.html -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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12. PUTIN THE GREAT Review and Outlook: The Wall Street Journal New York, New York, Wednesday, October 3, 2007 Vladimir Putin has announced that he will remain active in Russian politics, probably as prime minister, after his second presidential term expires next year. The sorry news in this is that it surprises no one. It has now been eight years since the world first learned of Mr. Putin, a KGB man vaulted almost overnight from municipal obscurity into the presidency by an ailing Boris Yeltsin. Mr. Putin made his political mark by initiating a second war against the breakaway province of Chechnya, using the pretext of a series of alleged terrorist bombings in Russia. According to Alexander Litvinenko, the one-time spy who became an opponent of the Putin regime before his murder last year, these bombings were orchestrated by the Russian secret services. By January 2000, the Chechen capital of Grozny resembled Dresden in 1945. Yet Western leaders did not turn away from Mr. Putin. On the contrary, they feted him as an "flawless democrat" (Gerhard Schröeder) and a man "deeply committed [to the] best interests of his country" (President Bush). He has been helped by the tripling of oil prices, a gift in part of Alan Greenspan's easy money Federal Reserve policy. The petrorubles have allowed Mr. Putin to service Russia's debts, build up its foreign-currency reserves, pay its miners, soldiers and civil servants, and turn Moscow and St. Petersburg into showcase cities; his job approval rating is near 70%. They have also helped obscure his policy of repression in the Caucasus, his attacks on independent media and domestic human rights organizations, and his appointment of KGB cronies to key positions of power. EFFORT TO STEAL UKRAINE'S 2004 ELECTION More difficult for the world to overlook has been Mr. Putin's meddling in the politics of Russia's neighbors: the oil and gas pipelines turned off in the dead of winter; the effort to steal Ukraine's 2004 election; the 2006 embargo imposed on tiny Georgia; this year's cyberwar against Estonia. The murder a year ago of crusading journalist Anna Politkovskaya and the polonium poisoning of Mr. Litvinenko were notable for the studied indifference they inspired in the Russian government. Mr. Putin eulogized Ms. Politkovskaya with the remark that her influence "was minimal." All of this has coincided with an increasingly assertive Russian foreign policy that often seeks to undermine U.S. interests. Most notably, a Russian veto threat continues to limit U.N. sanctions designed to stop Iran's nuclear program. Mr. Bush's restraint in criticizing Mr. Putin's domestic crackdown has been partly in the service of winning the Russian's cooperation on Iran -- to little effect. Given this career arc, it comes as no surprise that Mr. Putin now seeks to hold on to power, despite his previous Julius Caesar-like avowals to the contrary, and despite a constitutional limitation on remaining president for more than two successive terms. Coming on the heels of his surprise appointment of aging apparatchik Viktor Zubkov as prime minister, it seems Mr. Putin intends either to rule Russia from his parliamentary office or, using a constitutional loophole, perhaps return to the presidency after a decent interval. No doubt Mr. Putin will get away with this, given his control over the media and other levers of power. But he will still have to observe the formalities of a presidential election next year, and former chess champion Garry Kasparov has said he intends to lead the political opposition. The West needs to put Mr. Putin on notice that if Mr. Kasparov suffers some "accident" -- if, say, he is hit by a car -- the world will not look the other way. Bill Clinton made the mistake of welcoming Mr. Putin into the G-8, and Western leaders lack the will to expel him now. But his current maneuvering to retain power should make clear beyond doubt that Mr. Putin has ransacked the hopes the world once had for post-Soviet Russian democracy. He is reviving Russian authoritarianism, and the world's democracies need to prepare for its consequences. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119137825763247310.html ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service] ======================================================== Send in a letter-to-the-editor today. Let us hear from you. ======================================================== 13. ORANGE REVOLUTION -- RELOADED COMMENTARY: By Taras Kuzio, The Wall Street Journal Online New York, New York, Tuesday, October 2, 2007 KIEV -- Not since the heady days of the Orange Revolution has the atmosphere in Kiev been so electric. At the newly completed Hyatt, this city's only five-star hotel, the gathered journalists, international observers and Western political consultants awaited the arrival on Sunday evening of the woman who has changed the rules of Ukraine's political game. Yulia Tymoshenko strode into her election headquarters surrounded by a throng of bodyguards to a receptive welcome. Her bloc has become the pivotal political force in Ukraine. Kiev is ripe with expectation that Ms. Tymoshenko is set to return as prime minister of a rejuvenated Orange coalition with President Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense party. If so, she will have saved the Orange Revolution and Mr. Yushchenko. He would have become a lame-duck president had the governing Party of Regions won. Now he can even dream of a second term. More importantly, the relaunch of the Orange coalition would give the country another chance to introduce the reforms that millions of Ukrainians fought for three years ago, when they stood on the freezing Independence Square for 17 long days. If Mr. Yushchenko fails to seize this moment he'll be a spent force and few people will attend his political funeral. Counterintuitively, the election result is also good news for Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych's Regions party and the broader political culture in Ukraine. Only in opposition can Regions develop to a normal, democratic party for all Ukrainians. If it had managed to stay in power, it would most likely have continued its corrupt ways and remained a party that exploits the country's linguistic divide instead of bridging it. Ms. Tymoshenko has done the unthinkable by challenging Regions even in what it considered its Eastern Ukrainian fiefdom. There Ms. Tymoshenko's party got a respectable 15%-20% outside of the two traditional Regions strongholds of Donetsk and the Crimea. Regions garnered 50%-60% of the votes there. Her success in breaching traditional Regions territory in Russian-speaking Eastern Ukraine makes her party the country's only all-national political force. Country-wide, Ms. Tymoshenko's bloc came in a remarkably close second. Having had a slim lead after the early returns came in, her party stood at 31.8%, compared to 32.6% for the Regions party, with 80% of the vote tallied. Mr. Yushchenko immediately ordered an investigation into the vote counting. But even with this slightly diminished outcome, the Orange coalition should still have a comfortable majority in parliament. It remains a remarkable comeback given that in last year's elections, Ms. Tymoshenko's party came in 10 percentage points behind Regions. Mr. Yushchenko has nobody but himself to blame that his party only marginally improved its 2006 result of 14% to now 15%. As president, he was supposed to stand above the political fray and abstain from intervening in the elections. The Central Election Commission though was forced to reprimand him for campaigning on behalf of his party. In many of Ukraine's regions the local governors, who are appointed by the president, also worked for Our Ukraine. Mr. Yushchenko's unconstitutional election interfering turned voters off. Orange supporters disillusioned by Mr. Yushchenko's failure to act as a harbinger of revolutionary change turned to Ms. Tymoshenko. Without her support, Mr. Yushchenko -- with approval ratings of less than 20% -- cannot hope to be re-elected for a second term in two years time. Mr. Yushchenko now has the opportunity to rectify his biggest strategic mistake when he dismissed the Tymoshenko government in September 2005 after only eight months in office. The dismissal led to an 18-month split in the Orange camp and the return from political oblivion of Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions. The renewal of the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko alliance is not without its potential pitfalls. President Yushchenko has found it difficult to work with two strong prime ministers -- Ms. Tymoshenko and Mr. Yanukovych. That cooperation is only going to be more difficult since last year's constitutional reforms increased the powers of the parliament and the government vis-à-vis the president. Mr. Yushchenko can no longer simply remove the prime minister, as he did in 2005. Some in Mr. Yushchenko's entourage therefore prefer a grand coalition with Regions but with a technocrat at the helm, such as Yuri Yekhanurov, prime minister from 2005 to 2006, instead of Mr. Yanukovych. But those in the Yushchenko camp who favor shunning Ms. Tymoshenko still fail to understand the ramifications of Sunday's elections. They can either choose between Ms. Tymoshenko as an ally and prime minister now or as a competing Orange presidential candidate in 2009. With her support, he'll probably stand a good chance of being re-elected for a second term. If he has to compete against her, she'd almost certainly eliminate him in the first round of the presidential elections and probably defeat any Regions candidate the opposition could possibly field in the next round. Reviving the Orange coalition is Mr. Yushchenko's safest bet. Ukraine's second free and fair election in less than two years demonstrates a level of maturity of its democratic culture that has still not been fully recognized abroad. Western journalists in Kiev note the absence of anti-Western xenophobia they encounter in Moscow. Ukrainian voters have held politicians accountable for their actions. The attempt by Regions to mobilize Russian-speakers for a referendum to make Russian an official language and forswear future NATO membership failed to resonate with voters. But despite these achievements, the pro-reform forces are not powerful enough to successfully complete the postcommunist transition. They need outside support. In that respect, Ukraine is similar to other swing countries in Eastern Europe. It is unlikely that Romania would have been able to overcome the Ceaucescu legacy without the carrot of European Union membership. Sunday's election results have provided a new lease of life for the Orange Revolution. They also give the EU a second opportunity to replace its passivity toward Ukraine with true leadership. Ukraine deserves the same EU membership lifeline that was so instrumental in cementing Eastern Europe's new democracies in the early 1990s. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr. Kuzio is a research associate and former visiting professor at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, George Washington University. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119127608438245593.html -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service] ======================================================== 14. ORANGE UKRAINE Review & Outlook, The Wall Street Journal New York, New York, Tuesday, October 2, 2007 Another election in Ukraine, another marvel of post-Soviet democracy. We'll get to the outcome in a moment. Far more important was the spirited campaign, the free choice among various parties, high turnout and a result no one dare call illegitimate. All that's a far cry from the fledgling democracy next door in Russia, where next year's presidential election will almost certainly rubber stamp Vladimir Putin's choice. Sunday's election vindicates the Orange Revolution of 2004 -- yet again. Since millions of ordinary Ukrainians rose up peacefully and won the right to choose their own leaders, it's become fashionable to declare this color revolution dead. The villain of 2004, pro-Russian politician Viktor Yanukovych, came back last year to become Prime Minister and led the polls ahead of Sunday's parliamentary polls. The popularity of 2004 hero, President Viktor Yushchenko, is sinking. Some Orange partisans are aghast. The hand-wringing misses the point. The dramatic events of 2004 were about a lot more than particular personalities or policies. The Orange Revolution changed the rules of the political game. As we wrote then, Ukrainian rulers will think twice before daring to cheat their people out of a free press, debate and ballot. Nothing in the subsequent years and three elections makes us question this judgment. Messy politics -- also known as democracy -- hasn't made Ukraine harder to govern or hurt its economy, which grows at 7% a year. (Nearby Georgia, home to the rose revolution, is thriving as well.) No matter what Mr. Putin might like to claim, stability and freedom aren't mutually exclusive in this region. In free societies, political fortunes rise and fall, and as results trickled in yesterday, neither Mr. Yanukovych nor Mr. Yushchenko appeared to have won. Instead, Yulia Tymoshenko, the glamorous former oligarch who played a big role in the Orange protests, emerged the clearest victor. Her eponymous block gained 10 percentage points from the 2006 election, claiming 31.4% of the vote with nine-in-ten counted, two points behind Mr. Yanukovych's Party of the Regions. But Mr. Yushchenko's Our Ukraine was also up from the last poll, at 14.6%, setting the stage for the return of an Orange government. After mending fences with the President in recent weeks, Ms. Tymoshenko looks poised to form the next government, and Mr. Yanukovych may have to come to terms again with life in opposition. The country doesn't lack for problems. The last time Ms. Tymoshenko held the Prime Minister's post, for less than eight months in 2005 before the President sacked her, her chaotic governing style soured Ukrainians on the Orange bloc. Assuming the two parties together claim a majority of seats in parliament, as looks likely, and are able to strike a coalition deal, a Prime Minister Tymoshenko will be asked to manage the economy, implement her stated anti-corruption and pro-Western agenda, and deal with a lingering constitutional dispute. The current constitution vaguely divides powers between the executive and legislative branches; a referendum may be called to settle it. Arguments over the constitution brought months of political deadlock this year and forced the early election. Ukraine can't afford more of the same. Though its politics isn't always pretty, Ukraine continues to mock its obituarists. Divided between Russian- and Ukrainian-speakers in east and west, the country was supposed to have split long ago, possibly violently, as the CIA predicted in the early 1990s. Its free-wheeling politics is, in fact, a source of strength. The U.S. and particularly Europe can continue to lend a guiding hand for this new state, with Brussels hopefully showing a bit more enthusiasm for Kiev's aspirations to join the bloc one day. The hard work of building a functioning democracy is near complete in Ukraine. Sadly, that's yet to begin in Russia. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119127507001745546.html -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service] ======================================================== 15. UKRAINE VOTE HARMS RUSSIA TIES By Marc Champion, The Wall Street Journal, New York, New York, Tue, October 2, 2007; Page A8 Yulia Tymoshenko, the firebrand leader of Ukraine's Orange Revolution, emerged as the big winner in parliamentary elections, an outcome that could bring fresh upheaval to relations with Russia. It is unclear whether Ms. Tymoshenko will be Ukraine's next prime minister, but Sunday's vote has confirmed her as the driving force among the country's westward-leaning parties, and it appeared to give them enough seats in Parliament to form a government. That would be a welcome result for Western leaders and Ukrainians who supported the 2004 Orange Revolution, in which hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians protested to overturn fraudulent elections. At the time, it appeared that democracy movements were sweeping across the former Soviet Union; they have become mired in infighting since then. An Orange government would not likely be welcomed by Moscow, whose favored candidate, Viktor Yanukovich, lost in 2004 but returned to power as prime minister last year. As soon as Mr. Yanukovich took office, he halted Ukraine's bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which Moscow opposes. Ms. Tymoshenko has said she would seek to reopen negotiations with Russia over the price at which it sells natural gas to Ukraine and to shut out RosUkrEnergy, the opaque company half-owned by Russian state gas giant OAO Gazprom that handles the trade. Ukraine currently pays a little more than half the price some of its neighbors pay for gas, a result of negotiations Mr. Yanukovich conducted last year. Ms. Tymoshenko's party, Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko, increased its share of the vote by 10 percentage points from the 2006 election to 32%, with three-quarters of the ballots counted, Ukraine's Central Election Commission said. That put her half a percentage point behind the Party of the Regions, headed by Mr. Yanukovich. Our Ukraine, the party of President Viktor Yushchenko, placed third, with 15%. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Write to Marc Champion at marc.champion@wsj.com ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119128259953845785.html -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service] ======================================================== 16. UKRAINIAN TWIST TO A RUSSIAN FABLE Letter-to-the-Editor: From Mr Illya Rozenbaum, Brussels 1210, Belgium Financial Times, London, UK, Wed October 3 2007 Sir, Indeed it is unlikely that a "three-way tussle in Ukrainian election" (Report, October 1) between Viktor Yushchenko, Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovich will break the prolonged political deadlock in Ukraine. Ukrainians have long since dubbed the ongoing political squabble between the three politicians as "the Swan, the Crab and the Pike" after the fable by Krylov, the famous Russian writer. Occupying different natural habitats, no matter how hard the animals try, they fail in their collective pursuit of dragging the farm cart. Alas, despite some concrete achievements in the spheres of democracy and the rule of law, with noticeable growth and economic stability, Ukraine is unstable politically. The governing elite will continue to apply power in different directions without consulting one another (or indeed the ordinary citizens). With or without an outright winner of the elections, the question of a referendum about the most pressing issues currently tearing Ukraine apart is yet to be floated. Alternatively, the three main political forces have to find strong political will and broad consensus, or else be faced with the destruction of everything Ukrainians have achieved so far. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/12e118a2-714d-11dc-98fc-0000779fd2ac.html -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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======================================================== 17. UKRAINE'S ELECTIONS Have investors got too used to political uncertainty in Ukraine? COMMENTARY: Financial Times, London, UK, Tues, Oct 2 2007 Have investors got too used to political uncertainty in Ukraine? Preliminary results from last Sunday's elections, the third ballot in three years, suggest former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko may be able to form a coalition of so-called Orange parties,taking over from the previous government headed by Viktor Yanukovich. The outcome is not perhaps the one foreign investors would have chosen. But they have proved increasingly resilient to frequent political turmoil in Ukraine. Whether they are right to be so sanguine is questionable. The economic policies of both the Orange bloc and its rivals are a mixed bag. Ms Tymoshenko's last stint as prime minister in 2005 was marked by trade wars with Russia, although a Tymoshenko-led government and its neighbours might now pursue a less confrontational course. She is unlikely to reawaken the debate over illegal privatisations - while the discussion was morally defensible, uncertainty over property rights contributed to a severe economic slowdown under her watch. And the Orange bloc's desire for closer relations with the European Union could yield beneficial results. All the leading parties, however, are prone to unhelpful intervention in the economy. Ms Tymoshenko fought inflation with price controls, while Mr Yanukovich dismantled civil service and fiscal reforms and engaged in fire sale privatisations. And, whoever ends up forming a government, it is unlikely to last long, given the constitutional framework. That said, investors' willingness to ignore the unsatisfactory political environment in Ukraine has some support. Economic growth is running at more than 7 per cent year-on-year and will remain strong if metals prices, on which the economy depends, hold up. The current account deficit may be widening, but is well financed by foreign direct investment inflows. Foreign exchange reserves, meanwhile, are at a high. Market participants may well be right to focus on Ukraine's economic fundamentals rather than the antics of its politicians. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://www.ft.com/cms/s/1/690f9db6-714d-11dc-98fc-0000779fd2ac.html -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[return to index] Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service] ======================================================== You are welcome to send us names for the AUR distribution list. ======================================================== 18. IS UKRAINE MORE OF A DEMOCRACY THAN RUSSIA? Opinion & Analysis: Yevgeny Kozhokin for RIA RIA Novosti, Moscow, Russia, October 3, 2007 MOSCOW - Contrary to expectations, the political landscape of post-election Ukraine is not likely to be any smoother. As soon as the votes are counted, Ukraine will have a hard time forming a government. The ruling coalition will not take shape quickly despite the Orange majority's efforts to unite and put a good face on things. Given the state of personal relations between Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, and her excessive demands, any alliance they manage to form is bound to be fragile and short-lived and, most probably, will not make Ukraine any more tranquil. At the same time, there is a good chance that the Orange leaders will fail to strike a deal and that a future government will represent the same powerful economic and political forces as the former coalition did before the Rada's dissolution. Apart from the Party of Regions, the future coalition could include the Communists and the Socialists if they manage to overcome the 3% threshold. But these two scenarios are not exhaustive. Coalitions may take many and varied forms, even ones incredible to the mind of any sensible analyst. In Kiev non-stop talks are going on between all parties. Allegiances and enmities change in the blink of an eye. The real bone of contention is access to the resources of that rich country. Despite traumatic political upheavals, Ukraine has been doing rather well economically. The unprecedented success of Yulia Tymoshenko's bloc at the recent elections deserves special mention. It came as a surprise to many people although it has a logical explanation. The bloc fought a vigorous campaign, with Tymoshenko playing the first fiddle. She viewed these elections as the last and decisive battle. In a way, her bloc had the advantage of not being responsible for Ukraine's current problems. Not being associated with either the president or the government, Tymoshenko could lash out with equal ferocity both at Yushchenko and his supporters and Prime Minister Yanukovych's Party of Regions. It was an effective strategy; her energy helped her attract even hitherto alien voters to her banner, and won over some of Yanukovich's fans. Regrettably, the Party of Regions failed to carry out some of the promises it made during the previous election, such as to upgrade the status of the Russian language and to hold a referendum on Ukraine's entry to NATO. The leaders of the party and the government often applied double standards to key issues, losing the support of their voters as a result. For part of Ukrainian society, Tymoshenko has appeared to be more outspoken and appealing for that reason. The results of the current elections are bound to affect Russian-Ukrainian relations. If Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense and Tymoshenko's bloc form an Orange coalition, it will be more difficult for Russia to conduct dialogue and have normal cooperation with Ukraine than it was when it was under the Party of Regions and their allies. It is too risky to make any forecasts before the final results are announced, but whatever happens Russia should develop bilateral relations with Ukraine, or at least maintain the status quo. Being Ukraine's next-door neighbor, we are linked by tremendous economic interests. Nonetheless, we may have to face many complicated problems. On the one hand, we cannot be indifferent to what is taking place in Ukraine, on the other we should not interfere in its internal affairs. To maintain a proper balance, we should try to preserve good neighborly relations and partnership with Ukraine, and keep it away from NATO. Ukraine's entry into this alliance would have grievous consequences for our two nations. The parliamentary race in Ukraine is over. Could our own political elite derive any lessons from it on the eve of the approaching elections to the State Duma? The situation in Russia is very different in many respects - the political system, functioning of parties and conduct of voters. In this sense, it is hard to draw any parallels with the Ukrainian campaign. Yet, strange though it may seem, the Ukrainian Orange forces are similar to the most radical Russian parties in their approach to political problems. Though our respective political systems differ greatly, the basic political cultures of our two countries are pretty much the same. It makes no sense to try and determine which one of us is closer to the democratic ideal, because both still have to go a long way to reach it. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Yevgeny Kozhokin is the director of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies and a member of the RIA Novosti Expert Council. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service] ======================================================== 19. TYMOSHENKO BEST OPTION FOR RUSSIAN-UKRAINE RELATIONS RIA-Novosti, Moscow, Russia, Tuesday, October 2, 2007 MOSCOW - Out of all Ukrainian political leaders, (Yuliya) Tymoshenko is the most suitable politician for the development of Russian-Ukrainian relations, Stanislav Belkovskiy, the founder of the Russia -Ukraine Institute for National Strategy, has said at a news conference in Moscow. "Tymoshenko can find a common language with Russia better than any other Ukrainian politician," he said. Belkovskiy believes that trade and economic relations between Russia and Ukraine will not deteriorate if Tymoshenko becomes prime minister. "The whole set of Russian-Ukrainian relations boils down to energy supplies and in particular the gas issue. If Tymoshenko becomes prime minister, RosUkrEnergo (Swiss-registered Gazprom-linked intermediary selling gas to Ukraine) as the main gas supplier will disappear but the volume of supplies to Ukraine will not change," he believes. At the same time Belkovskiy said that chances of creating an Orange coalition (Our Ukraine -People's Self-Defence bloc and Yuliya Tymoshenko bloc) and a broad coalition (Party of Regions, Our Ukraine -People's Self-Defence bloc, Lytvyn bloc) were equal. He believes that any developments are possible. However, he added that if a broad coalition is set up and Tymoshenko does not manage to become prime minister, she may provoke a sharp destabilization of the political situation in Ukraine. "Tymoshenko may leave parliament and try to trigger a preliminary presidential election," Belkovskiy said. At the same time he added that Tymoshenko's taking the prime minister's post will mean a change of the political system in Ukraine and a total failure of the previous political elite. Tymoshenko will try to set up a new hierarchy of power. Belkovskiy believes that in these conditions the freedom of press and healthy political competition will disappear in Ukraine. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service] ======================================================== 20. COLOUR BLIND Editorial: The Guardian, London, UK, Tuesday October 2, 2007 Three years after thousands of protesters braved the biting cold of Kiev's main square to launch the orange revolution, it is business as usual in Ukraine. The country is deadlocked after its fourth national election since the revolution. Viktor Yanukovich, who sparked the popular revolt by trying to steal a presidential election, is a new man - or so he would have us believe. Once seen as Moscow's loyal servant, Mr Yanukovich's Party of the Regions is still blue in colour and derives its support from the Russian-speaking industrial east. But now a US firm of PR consultants helps him soften his post-Soviet image, and he claims he is a Ukrainian nationalist. His party is on course to win Sunday's parliamentary election, although he will need to form a coalition if he is to continue as prime minister. The other winner is Yulia Tymoshenko, a neoliberal orange revolutionary, who has harvested popular discontent against the rich and powerful, despite being both herself. She, too, claims the right to form a new government. The only undoubted loser is Our Ukraine, the party of President Viktor Yushchenko. It was his pockmarked face from dioxin poisoning that symbolised the dirty fight to wrestle Ukraine from the grip of authoritarian government. But after three years of political chaos, his options have narrowed considerably. He either has to bury the hatchet with his former orange partner Ms Tymoshenko (whom he sacked as prime minister two years ago amid bitter recriminations) or he has to get into bed with Mr Yanukovich. Neither appeals. Forget the sea of orange tents in Kiev three years ago. Mr Yushchenko views his former partner Ms Tymoshenko as his nemesis and would still do almost anything to prevent her becoming prime minister again. It would be easier for him to form a coalition with his ideological foe Mr Yanukovich. Moderate businessmen in both orange and blue camps pushed their respective leaders to call this election, in the hope that the two would go into a coalition as a result. But Mr Yushchenko must also think about his prospects of being re-elected president in two or three years time. His party is already trailing badly in third place and could disappear altogether, after several years in partnership with Mr Yanukovich's professional party machine. Much will depend on deals struck with the smaller parties - the communists, the socialists and a party formed of people once allied to the former president Leonid Kuchma. There are some positives to be drawn from this. This was a fair election, and there is now more democracy in Ukraine three years on. But it is in a state of permanent political crisis, and for this it has its inadequate leaders to thank. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- LINK: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/story/0,,2181702,00.html -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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21. A PALER SHADE OF ORANGE Ukrainians know very well their election has been hijacked again Commentary: By Adam Swain, The Guardian London, UK, Wednesday October 3, 2007 The deft way in which Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, is trying to ensure he remains in power even after he has left the presidency will ensure that Ukraine remains a recurring theme in US-Russian rivalry. Its role in this geopolitical contest lessens further still the likelihood that Sunday's parliamentary elections will resolve the long-running power struggle between the president, Viktor Yushchenko, and the prime minister, Viktor Yanukovych. It is a tangled, tense struggle. Yushchenko swept to power when the orange revolution was triggered by the attempts of Yanukovych's backers to rig the 2004 presidential election. But he was forced to nominate Yanukovych as prime minister following the latter's success in last year's parliamentary election. Yanukovych's Party of the Regions will remain the largest force, but if, as seems most likely, Yushchenko opts to enter into a coalition with Yuliya Tymoshenko, his partner during the orange revolution, they could form a government with a slim majority. It's no secret that Yanukovych regards this pre-term election as the fraudulent outcome of a crisis manufactured by Yushchenko and his western backers to shore up pro-western parties. Fearing that Yanukovych's coalition government was about to increase its parliamentary majority to enable it to overrule the president and change the constitution, Yushchenko controversially dissolved parliament in April. There have been suspicions that elements in the west, fearing that the Yanukovych government was endangering Ukraine's drift to the west, helped to conjure up a context in which Yushchenko could dissolve parliament. During the crisis, the west's promotion of democracy was certainly partisan and designed to promote its geopolitical interests against a resurgent Russia. Tymoshenko's support for the transfer of powers from the president to the prime minister in January appears to have been the first act in an elaborate power play that was scripted in Washington, in which the two orange revolutionaries have, perhaps unwittingly, been caught. Yushchenko shouldered the responsibility for the unpopular decision to dissolve parliament, while hinting at a possible post-election coalition with the Party of the Regions to stop it boycotting the poll. Tymoshenko distanced herself from the crisis, but once the election date was set she ran a populist campaign that portrayed her as a democrat and Yanukovych as little more than a post-Soviet mafia don. Tymoshenko and Yushchenko campaigned independently until late last week, when they announced they would seek to form a coalition government. The election may be challenged in the courts, raising the spectre of a protracted legal morass. Even the rapid formation of a new coalition may not guarantee stable government. The Party of the Regions will feel aggrieved that its pragmatic decision to participate in what it regards as an illegal election has resulted in ejection from office. As the resignation of 150 members of parliament was used as the final legal justification for staging the early election, in the new parliament Yanukovych and Tymoshenko will have an effective veto over its operation and the formation of any new government. Also a cabinet without any representation from the industrial and financial heartland in the east of the country, where the Party of Regions is most popular, will find it difficult to implement economic reform. What will now be a three-way power struggle erodes the electorate's faith in their politicians and in their political parties, as a drop in turnout at the weekend showed. The political crisis, manufactured or otherwise, reinforces an east-west electoral divide that undermines the legitimacy of the state, prevents good governance and jeopardises economic development. Washington's script may have unfolded largely as directed so far, but the denouement has yet to be drafted. Triggering an election that would inevitably be regarded as illegitimate by many was bound to plunge the country into yet another spell of political disorientation. The intention is to postpone the final scene until the west can be certain of the happy ending it seeks. It is not too late, however, for the country's politicians to ignore the self-interested overtures emanating from Russia and the west, and recognise their potential, and their responsibility, to become the authors of their own democratic future. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Adam Swain is a lecturer in the school of geography, University of Nottingham. adam.swain@nottingham.ac.uk ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- LINK: http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,2182214,00.html ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service] ======================================================== 22. UK'S GUARDIAN NEWSPAPER'S DISTORTED REPORTS Letter-to-the-Editor: From Askold Krushelnycky, UK Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #875, Article 22 Washington, D.C. Thursday, October 4, 2007 Dear Morgan, Greetings to you and thank you for all your continuing sterling work. I am in Kyiv for the elections and hope we'll be able to meet. I see the UK's Guardian newspaper has been behaving shamefully again in its election coverage. You may already know the Guardian behaved in a disgraceful way towards the truth in the 1930s as the information below shows. Please free feel to use it if you feel it is of any interest. The seriously flawed election coverage by the British Guardian newspaper, portions of which have been reprinted and mocked in a condign way by some Ukrainian media for factual errors and pro-Yanukovych bias, echoes the newspaper's disgraceful behavior during the 1933 Stalin-engineered Holodomor famine. The publication was then called The Manchester Guardian and was know for its left-wing sympathies which rendered some of its editors particularly gullible to Stalin's propaganda or willing to turn a blind eye to the communists' crimes, whose actions in the Holodomor claimed the lives of millions who suffered the excruciating agony of death by starvation. An exception to that collaboration by stupidity or intent in covering up Stalin's crimes was the Guardian's Moscow correspondent, Malcolm Muggeridge. At the time he was a committed Communist but he was also a journalist of integrity who was disturbed by the rumors of mass starvation reaching the western correspondents cocooned in the comfort of Moscow. At considerable personal risk, Muggeridge smuggled himself out of Moscow and managed to get to the Ukrainian countryside where he was horrified by the nightmarish scenes of dead and dying that greeted him everywhere. He returned to Moscow and wrote a series of stories exposing the use of starvation by the communist as the terrible means to liquidate a portion of society that was viewed as an enemy by the Moscow regime – smallholder farmers who wanted to control their own lives and not be subsumed into state or collective farms. And although the farmers and their families were not all ardent Ukrainian nationalists, the village and countryside had always been a repository of Ukrainian culture and language. But the Moscow sympathizers among the editors at the Manchester Guardian's offices in England tried to cast doubt on the validity of Muggeridge's stories. In a shameful attempt to suppress their own correspondent's eye witness accounts of mass murder, the stories were shrunk down in size and instead of being splashed on the front page, hidden inside the newspaper. The positioning of the story suggested to readers and other journalists, who might have also pursued the story, that the paper itself thought the reports unreliable. So few followed up the story of this obscene crime against humanity. Muggeridge left the Guardian and the Communist Party and went on to become one of Britain's most respected and influential journalists, known for his wit and moral clarity. The present disgusting coverage of Ukraine by The Guardian is largely driven by an un-reformed old communist hack, Jonathan Steele, who is still smarting from getting the orange revolution coverage all wrong. He was then responsible for assigning the actions of the Ukrainian democratic camp to merely following a scenario prepared by the State Dept and Langley. He was stung by the criticism leveled by readers and journalists at his ridiculous coverage. He claims, for a change probably correctly, that he received hate mail from Britons of Ukrainian origin. So a wounded and vain Steele has relentlessly tried to pour cold water on the Orange Revolution and the pro-democratic and pro-western political forces in Ukraine. He is regarded as a font of wisdom by some of his Champagne Socialist colleagues who still justify the criminal idea of communism despite its ejection by the people who actually had to live under it. It is his influence that has led to the Guardian distorting much of its Ukraine coverage in a very creepy way and making itself an apologist for another Moscow driven travesty – Viktor Yanukovych's Party of the Regions. With my best wishes, Askold Krushelnycky
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======================================================== 23. UKRAINE CALLS ON U.N. TO DENOUNCE 1930s FAMINE By Patrick Worsnip, Reuters, New York, NY, Wed, Oct 3, 2007 UNITED NATIONS - Ukraine called on the United Nations on Wednesday to condemn publicly the man-made famine that killed millions of Ukrainians during Josef Stalin's forced collectivization drive more than seven decades ago. In a speech to the U.N. General Assembly, First Deputy Foreign Minister Volodymyr Khandogiy also urged the assembly to establish an international day to commemorate victims of genocides. Khandogiy said such a day would help people to learn from the past and avoid crimes against humanity being repeated. Last November, Ukraine's parliament formally denounced the 1932-33 famine as "genocide of the Ukrainian people." Khandogiy's speech implied, but did not specifically state, that the United Nations should also consider it genocide. He said the famine -- which historians estimate killed about 7.5 million people -- was "perpetrated by the Soviet totalitarian regime for the purpose of annihilation of the rural population as the backbone of the Ukrainian nation". "This horrific crime, which ranks among the worst catastrophes ever experienced by humankind, is still awaiting international condemnation," Khandogiy said. "We sincerely hope that the United Nations as the collective moral authority and effective instrument in safeguarding human rights and fundamental freedoms, will raise its voice and denounce the horrendous disaster," he said. Russia, a veto-holder in the U.N. Security Council, has resisted Kiev's requests to acknowledge the tragedy as genocide, fearing that could fuel anti-Russian sentiment in Ukraine, which has a substantial ethnic Russian minority. The famine was caused by the requisition of grain to break the spirit of Ukraine's farmers. The campaign was the worst of three famines that gripped Ukraine under Soviet rule. Never recognized by the Soviet Union, the famine was only commemorated after the end of communism in 1991, which led to Ukraine and other Soviet republics winning independence. The issue remains politically controversial in Ukraine. Only a narrow majority of Ukrainian parliamentarians approved last November's bill, long sought by President Viktor Yushchenko to press for world recognition of the calamity. The minister was speaking as a political deadlock gripped Ukraine following inconclusive elections on Sunday. During the famine, systematic confiscation of grain and livestock left millions to die in their homes or in the street, with soldiers dumping bodies into pits. Cannibalism became rife. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKN0321891120071003?pageNumber=1 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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======================================================== 24. GORBACHEV WARNS RUSSIANS AGAINST RISE OF STALINISM By Dmitry Solovyov, Reuters, Wednesday, September 26, 2007 MOSCOW - Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev warned Russians on Wednesday of the risk of a rebirth of Stalinism, saying their country was in danger of forgetting its tragic past. "We should remember those who suffered, because this a lesson for all of us," Gorbachev told a conference marking 70 years since the start of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's Great Terror. "We must squeeze Stalinism out of ourselves, not in single drops but by the glass or bucket," Gorbachev added. "There are those saying Stalin's rule was the Golden Age, while (Nikita) Khrushchev's thaw was sheer utopia and (Leonid) Brezhnev's neo-Stalinism was the continuation of the Golden Age." During the Great Terror, 1.7 million Soviet citizens were arrested between August 1937 and November 1938, of whom 818,000 were executed, the human rights group Memorial said. Historians estimate that up to 13 million people were killed or sent to labor camps in the former Soviet Union between 1921 and 1953, the year Stalin died. Despite Stalin's record, recent polls have shown many young Russians have a positive view of the former Soviet leader and there have been attempts this year to play down his excesses, which have found an echo among the country's youth. Fifty-four percent of Russian youth believe that Stalin did more good than bad and half said he was a wise leader, according to a poll conducted in July by the Yuri Levada Centre. TELEVISION DOCUMENTARY A prime-time television documentary drama series at the start of this year drew critical fire by attempting to portray Stalin in a new light, as a man with a conscience who sought a relationship with God in his final days. President Vladimir Putin has never praised Stalin. However, he stirred controversy at a meeting with teachers when he appeared to play down the Great Terror, saying Russia "must not allow others to impose a feeling of guilt on us" and adding that the country had "not had such bleak pages (in history) as was the case with Nazism." A new history teaching manual partly authored by Putin's chief political strategist Vladislav Surkov and unveiled in June described Stalin as brutal but also "the most successful leader of the USSR." It gave few details of the Great Terror, instead emphasizing Stalin's achievements in rebuilding the Soviet economy after World War Two and industrializing the country. "It was namely during his leadership that the country's area was expanded to the borders of the former Russian empire (and sometimes beyond them), victory was gained in the greatest war -- the Great Patriotic War, industrialization was achieved and cultural revolution accomplished," the textbook says. Gorbachev, praised in the West as a man who ended the Cold War but vilified by many Russians for presiding over the Soviet Union's chaotic collapse, triggered a heated discussion at the conference about the new history manual. "A massive campaign to revise the collective memory is under way," said Irina Shcherbakova, a Memorial project coordinator. "We plunge them (Russia's younger generation) into half-lies, half-truth, and in the end we get ready-made cynics." ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- LINK: http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKL268062220070926 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service] ======================================================== 25. REMAKING HISTORY IN A KIEV MUSEUM By Dmitry Shlapentokh, The Moscow Times Moscow, Russia, Thursday, October 4, 2007. Issue 3757. Page 8. Constructing a new national identity often requires a new vision of the past. In Ukraine, this phenomenon can be seen in several of Kiev's museums. Exhibits at the Museum of the Army of Ukraine show the Ukrainians as European people who enjoyed monolithic unity while busily liberating themselves from the "Asiatic" Russians. Ukrainian history has emerged differently in the other major national museum, the Museum of Ukrainian History. Russia is still seen as a major problem, but the flavor of the museum is distinctly different. Russians often disappear from sight, and Ukraine's conflicts with everybody else are also downplayed. In fact, Ukrainians are presented as self-sustained, peaceful people who preserve their distinct lifestyles despite being incorporated into a foreign empire. It seems this image of Ukraine's past -- and implicitly, its present -- is what Ukrainian authorities have tried to develop and inculcate. The arrangement of the displays in the Museum of Ukrainian History was markedly different from what I saw in my youth. There weren't many changes in the hall dedicated to the Stone and Bronze Ages, but later periods had gaping omissions. Events that were prominent in Soviet days disappeared or were marginalized. There was practically nothing about the Mongols, presumably because featuring the Mongol invasion and Mongol yoke would require elaborating on Russia's positive role in fighting the invaders. The Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654 -- the lynchpin of Ukrainian history that ultimately led to Ukraine's incorporation into Russia -- was reduced to a marginal episode. The famous painting depicting this event that had hung prominently in the museum in Soviet times was taken away. A small note informed visitors that there was no Ukrainian-Russian unification as such, but rather a Russian "protectorate" in which Ukraine preserved independence -- or some sort of autonomy that was close to independence. The reign of Peter the Great and his fight with the Swedes on Ukrainian territory also posed a big dilemma for the exhibition organizers. Celebrating Peter's victories was out of the question. One option for the museum was to stress the glory of Ivan Mazepa, the Ukrainian noble who took the Swedish side in the battle and tried to save his people from the rule of the brutal Asiatics. The other option was to ignore the event entirely, which is precisely what the organizers did. As a result, Peter the Great and the Battle of Poltava disappeared from the exhibit. In addition, the big hall dedicated to the War of 1812 with Napoleon, an epic event in European history, also disappeared. Information about the war was reduced to a picture of Russian general Mikhail Kutuzov and a few artifacts. When those who organized the museum moved to the 20th century, they faced another problem -- how to reconcile revolutionary violence with the theory of national unity, the major premise of the political philosophy of Ukraine's elite. In fact, there was no information whatsoever about the revolutionary movement. The 1905 Revolution was ignored even though Ukraine was one of the epicenters of the revolution, especially in cities like Odessa and Sevastopol. The February and October Revolutions of 1917 also disappeared. A typical visitor to the museum might leave with the impression that the conflict was not between the Whites and Reds at all but between an independent, nationalistic Ukraine and the Russian state. World War II was also marginalized, and nothing was displayed about postwar Soviet history, implying that the war helped strengthen Ukraine's incorporation into a foreign empire -- that is, the Soviet Union. The 2004 Orange Revolution, however, was prominently displayed, suggesting that it brought Ukraine closer to Europe -- its historical destiny. Incorporation into the European family implied the sacred notion of "multiculturalism" and ethnic and religious tolerance. The exhibit pointed out that Ukraine is populated not just by Ukrainians but also by Tatars and Jews, and all nationalities live in apparent harmony. There was no information about the Holocaust, possibly because it would require elaboration on the unpleasant role many Ukrainians played in the "final solution of the Jewish question." The vision of history as science was also quite different from what I encountered in other museums. The Ukrainian officials all claimed that they had presented history accurately, and they angrily rejected any notion that history was arranged to suit current political needs. The representatives of the Museum of Ukrainian History were much more open in their views of history as the servant of political necessity. I talked with an elderly woman who sat in the hall and watched over the visitors, sharing my amazement at how displays of Ukrainian history had changed radically since my last visit, more than 30 years ago. The woman took note of my ironical smile and responded that I had a wrong view of history. In my view, history is fixed. This is not the case, she said, because history should follow the lead of current politics. I told her that what she stated fit the postmodernist vision, which says that there is no objective truth but just a construction of history, and that there are only politically correct or politically incorrect views. She responded that she had never heard of postmodernism or political correctness, but she fully supported the idea nonetheless. The presentation of Ukrainian history in the Museum of Ukrainian History seems to be the image that the Ukrainian elite is trying to spread. It involves emphasizing Ukraine as an independent political force and ignoring or minimizing all events where Russia played a prominent and positive role. I found the same version of history in the Museum of National Art. At one exhibition dealing with modern art, the curator explained that after 1991, the paintings dealing with the Great Patriotic War -- which were used by Moscow during the Soviet period to emphasize the unity of Ukrainians and Russians -- had been removed. Instead, there was a big painting that displayed the entry into Kiev of Bogdan Khmelnytsky, one of Ukraine's greatest national heroes. After my visit of Kiev's museums, I became even more convinced of the validity of the quote attributed to Gregory Bateson, the British anthropologist, social scientist and linguist: "History is as unpredictable as the future." ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dmitry Shlapentokh is a professor of history at Indiana University South Bend. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/10/04/006.html -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service] ======================================================== 26. UKRAINE MARKS 66TH ANNIVERSARY OF NAZI MASSACRE AT BABI YAR RAVINE
The Associated Press, Kiev, Ukraine, Saturday, September 29, 2007 KIEV, Ukraine: Ukraine on Saturday marked the 66th anniversary of the Nazi massacre of tens of thousands of Jews and others at a Kiev ravine called Babi Yar, with President Viktor Yushchenko vowing to promote tolerance and stem xenophobia. The Babi Yar massacre has come to epitomize the decimation of Ukraine's Jews and be seen as a precursor to the gas chambers of the
Holocaust.
The Nazis began the killings on Sept. 29, 1941, and in the course of just two days they machine-gunned at least 33,771 people, according to their own records. Bodies of victims choked the ravine. In the ensuing months, the number of people killed at Babi Yar grew to more than 100,000, and included Roma, or Gypsies, as well as other Kiev residents and Red Army prisoners. A somber Yushchenko, flanked by other senior officials, laid a bouquet of scarlet roses at the foot of a massive bronze monument commemorating the victims. "Ukraine will forever preserve the memory of the Babi Yar tragedy," Yushchenko said in an address posted on his Web site. "In our country there is not and will not be a place for ethnic intolerance and enmity, and the lawlessness of totalitarian regimes will never be repeated." Babi Yar was also a symbol of Soviet-enforced silence. For decades the Soviet Union kept quiet about what happened, and a monument put up after poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko drew international attention to the massacre with his 1961 poem "Babi Yar" made no mention of Jews. It was not until 1991, as the Soviet Union began to crumble, that Jews were allowed to erect a memorial at the ravine. Ukraine was once home to a thriving Jewish community; about 20 percent of Kiev's population of 875,000 was Jewish before the war. Today, there are 103,000 Jews in all of Ukraine, according to official data, although the number is believed to be several times higher. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service] ======================================================== 27. NEW LIGHT SHED ON HOLOCAUST IN UKRAINE By Angela Charlton, Associated Press, Paris, France, Wed, Oct 3, 2007 PARIS - Who is to blame for the killing of 1.4 million Jews in Nazi-occupied Ukraine? And what can be done now to dispel age-old anti-Semitism in Ukraine, honor Jewish dead and move on? For the first time, scholars from around the world shared documents and knowledge about the Holocaust in Ukraine at a conference this week in Paris dedicated to this poorly understood passage in Adolf Hitler's torrent of terror across the continent. The talks were not easy, as resentment, frustration and emotion bubbled repeatedly to the surface among the researchers from Israel, Ukraine, Germany, the United States and elsewhere. While no major surprises emerged, pieces of Ukraine's Holocaust story came together as never before: killings of Jews in western Ukraine before the Nazis arrived, botched Soviet orders to evacuate Jews from the encroaching Germans, mass grave sites only now being discovered - even as long-known Jewish grave sites are being abandoned, razed or used as open-air markets. "We cannot underestimate this. It is historic, it is history that ... may be changed based on new information," said Mikhail Tyaglyy of the Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies. History books, too, may need to be changed - or written - to explain how an estimated 1.4 million of Ukraine's 2.4 million Jews disappeared in just three years from 1941-1944. After repeated waves of emigration, only about 100,000 remain today, according to official figures. While the Holocaust has been well-documented in Western and Central Europe, few have studied what happened when the Nazis overran what is now Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and western Russia. Soviet authorities discouraged such scholarship, c |