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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT -
AUR
An International
Newsletter, The Latest, Up-To-Date
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis and Commentary
Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business,
Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the
World
CONFLICT HOLDS LESSONS FOR
UKRAINE
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT - AUR - Number
896
Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor,
SigmaBleyzer
WASHINGTON, D.C., SATURDAY, AUGUST 16, 2008
INDEX OF ARTICLES
------
Clicking on the title of any article takes
you directly to the
article.
Return to Index by clicking on Return to
Index at the end of each article
COMMENTARY & ANALYSIS: By Steven Pier
Visiting Fellow, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine from 1998-2000.
Senior Advisor, U.S.-Ukraine
Business Council (USUBC)
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFL/RL)
Washington, D.C., Friday,
August 15, 2008
Richard Weitz, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
World Politics Review contributing editor
World Politics Review Exclusive, Institute of World Politics
OP-ED: William Horton Beebe-Center
President, Eurasia Foundation, Washington, D.C.
International Herald Tribune (IHT), Paris, France, Friday, August 15,
2008
By Maryana Drach, Kyiv, Ukraine
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
(RFE/RL)
Prague, Czech Republic, Friday, August 15, 2008
By Peter Fedynsky, Moscow, VOA Correspondent
Voice of America (VOA),
Washington, D.C., Friday, August 15, 2008
At least for now, the smoke seems to be clearing from the Georgian
battlefield.
But the extent of the wreckage reaches far beyond that small country.
COMMENTARY: By John R Bolton
Former US Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Telegraph,
London, UK, Friday, August 15, 2008
By Rachel Morajee in London, Financial Times
London, UK, Friday, August 15 2008
SigmaBleyzer, The Bleyzer Foundation
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, August 12, 2008
By Peter Apps, Reuters, London, UK, Friday August 15 2008
Peter Apps, Reuters, London, UK, Thu Aug 14, 2008
OP-ED: By Mikheil Saakashvili, President of Georgia
The Washington Post,
Washington, D.C.
Thursday, August 14, 2008; Page A17
OP-ED: By Anne Applebaum, Author, Columnist
Telegraph, London, UK,
Friday, August 8, 2008
COMMENTARY & ANALYSIS: By Igor Khrestin
Central Europe Digest, Center for European Policy Analysis
Washington, D.C., Friday, 15 August 2008
14
.
UKRAINE UNSETTLED BY RUSSIA'S INVASION OF GEORGIA
By Brian
Bonner, Special Correspondent, McClatchy Newspapers
The Herald Tribune,
Rock Hill, South Carolina, Friday, August 15, 2008
15
.
UKRAINE'S PRESIDENT WANTS NEW RUSSIAN FLEET DEAL The Associated Press, Kiev, Ukraine, Saturday, August 16, 2008
Will Ukraine be next after Georgia?
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Taras Kuzio
Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 5, Issue 154
The Jamestown Foundation, Wash. D.C., Tuesday, August 12, 2008
20
. UKRAINE AND THE CONFLICT IN SOUTH
OSSETIAUkraine threatens to prevent return of Russian Black Sea Fleet
vessels
Commentary & Analysis: By Roman Kupchinsky
Eurasia Daily
Monitor, Volume 5, Issue 153
The Jamestown Foundation, Wash. D.C., Monday, August 11, 2008
The Jamestown Foundation, Wash. D.C., Friday, August 15, 2008
COMMENTARY & ANALYSIS, By Jan Maksymiuk
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)
Prague, Czech Republic, Friday, August 15, 2008
NEWS ANALYSIS: By Judy Dempsey, The New York Times
New York, New York, Friday, August 15, 2008
24
. MYTHMAKING IN
MOSCOW
Georgia wasn't committing 'genocide,' and the Russians
aren't keeping the peace.
LEAD EDITORIAL, The Washington Post
Washington, D.C., Saturday, August 16, 2008; Page A14
Bush Administration's second-rate response to the crisis
By Andrew Ward in Washington, Financial Times
London, UK, Saturday, August 16, 2008
By Chrystia Freeland, U.S. Managing Editor of the FT
Financial Times, London, UK, Saturday, August 16 2008
COMMENTARY & ANALYSIS: By Steven
Pier
Visiting Fellow, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine from 1998-2000.
Senior Advisor, U.S.-Ukraine
Business Council (USUBC)
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFL/RL)
Washington, D.C., Friday,
August 15, 2008
Analysts have begun to weigh the significance of the Russian-Georgian
conflict for Russia's other neighbors and for Western relations with those
countries. What lessons should Ukraine draw?
The speed of the launch of Russian military operations makes clear that
Moscow was ready to act and only sought a pretext; the Georgians, unfortunately,
provided one. Russian forces quickly broadened the conflict beyond South
Ossetia, launching air strikes throughout Georgia, deploying into Abkhazia, and
occupying parts of Georgia outside of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
The scale of the Russian attack suggests Moscow was motivated by more than
just the situation in South Ossetia. Tbilisi's independent foreign-policy
course, particularly its desire to join NATO and the European Union, angers
Moscow, which seeks a zone of influence in the former Soviet space.
The Kremlin also intended its actions to send a message to other
neighboring states, including Ukraine, and to the West. As Ukrainians think
through what this means for their foreign-policy course, there are a number of
considerations.
The Russians seek to draw a line between Europe and the former Soviet
space. Moscow wants Ukraine and Georgia on the eastern side of that line, and
wants neither NATO nor the European Union to cross it. While the Kremlin focuses
its objections now on NATO enlargement, Ukrainians should assume that, if
prospects develop for Ukraine's entry into the European Union, Russia will
object vociferously to that as well.
Moscow's increasingly assertive policy poses challenges for Kyiv and the
West. NATO and the European Union must consider carefully their strategies of
engaging states to their east. Some will argue that, given Russian opposition,
NATO should back away from Membership Action Plans (MAPs) for Ukraine or
Georgia.
That would be a mistake. It would encourage Moscow to believe that its
pressure tactics -- which have included threatening Ukraine with nuclear weapons
and questioning the country's territorial integrity and, in Georgia's case,
worse -- have succeeded. A Russia that sees success in such tactics will not be
an easy country with which to deal.
Moscow would like to limit Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, to
isolate it from European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. Most Ukrainians who
favor joining NATO and the European Union do so because they want their country
to be a "full member" of Europe. This is not anti-Russian. The Kremlin, however,
applies an outdated zero-sum logic by which Ukraine's drawing closer to Europe
somehow damages Russian interests.
Dealing with this is a challenge for Ukrainian foreign policy. Whatever
decision Ukraine ultimately makes on joining NATO and the European Union is a
decision for Ukrainians. Regardless of their specific preferences regarding
relations with NATO or the European Union, all Ukrainian political forces
presumably want to protect the sovereignty of Ukrainian decision-making.
Faced with the likelihood of continuing Russian pressure against Ukraine's
pro-European course, what should Kyiv do?
[1] First and foremost,
it is not the time for a divided government. President Viktor Yushchenko and
Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko must end their infighting and together pursue a
coherent policy. The government should also talk to the Party of Regions.
Leaders of that party may one day be back in power. They should share the
government's interest in protecting Ukraine's right to set its own
foreign-policy course.
[2] Second, the
government needs to make a real education effort on NATO and the advantages and
disadvantages of membership for Ukraine. Based on an understanding of what NATO
is today -- a very different organization from it was during the Cold War -- and
what it can offer Ukraine, the Ukrainian people can decide what is in their
country's interest.
If Ukrainians continue to oppose membership, the leadership should draw the
appropriate conclusion. NATO will not take in a country if the population
disagrees. If, on the other hand, better understanding leads to growing public
support for NATO, that will strengthen the government's hand.
[3] Third, the
government should reduce vulnerabilities to Russian pressure. This means paying
energy debts on time, so that Moscow has no pretext for reducing the flow of
gas. It means energy conservation and developing domestic gas and oil resources
in order to enhance Ukraine's energy security. And it means managing the
gas-transit system in an open and transparent manner.
A Ukraine that strengthens its own energy-security situation and serves as
a reliable and transparent transporter of energy to Europe will reduce its
exposure to Russian energy pressures and can become an indispensable part of
Europe's energy future.
[4] Fourth, Russia has
exploited the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to destabilize
Georgia. While the Georgian and Ukrainian situations are different, the
Ukrainian government should keep a close watch to make sure Russia does not use
the language or ethnic issues to create pressure points, especially in Crimea.
One potential pressure point is the Black Sea Fleet.
Ukraine has the right, as a sovereign country, to insist on the fleet's
departure when the current basing agreement lapses in 2017 and to address with
Moscow the activities of warships operating from Ukrainian ports. But perhaps
now may not be the time to try to accelerate negotiations on the fleet's
departure. Ukraine can be pro-European and still try to maintain good relations
with Russia.
Russia is playing a serious game with regard to the former Soviet space.
Kyiv needs to respond with equal seriousness. A serious Ukrainian response -- a
coherent government, growing public support for a pro-European course, and
addressing vulnerabilities in the Ukraine-Russia relationship -- will strengthen
Ukraine's ability to withstand Russian pressure. It likewise will have a
positive effect on how the West and Euro-Atlantic institutions view Ukraine and
its pro-European course.
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NOTE: Steven Pifer, who served as U.S. ambassador to Ukraine from 1998 to
2000, is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution. Pifer also serves as a
Senior Advisor to the U.S.-Ukraine Business Council (USUBC). The views
expressed in this commentary are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect
those of RFE/RL or USUBC.
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2
. IS UKRAINE NEXT? GEORGIAN
WAR EXACERBATES RUSSIA-UKRAINE RELATIONS
By Richard Weitz, Senior
Fellow, Hudson Institute
World Politics Review contributing editor
World Politics Review Exclusive, Institute of World Politics
Washington, D.C., Friday, August 15, 2008
The War in Georgia has
seriously exacerbated relations between Russia and Ukraine's pro-Western
government. On Aug. 12, Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko joined the leaders
of four other former Soviet states in Tbilisi to show solidarity with Georgia
and its embattled president, Mikheil Saakashvili.
Yushchenko told the crowd that had assembled in Tbilisi's central square:
"You will never be left alone! . . . We have come to reaffirm your sovereignty,
your independence, your territorial integrity. These are our values. Independent
Georgia is and independent Georgia will always be!"
The following day,
President Yushchenko boldly imposed severe restrictions on the movement of
Russian military units in Ukraine. Specifically, he directed that Russian
warships, warplanes, or other military units give 72 hours' notice before moving
within Ukrainian territory.
The order also applies to ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet seeking to
reenter their home base at Sevastopol. The Russian Foreign Ministry attacked the
measures as a "serious, new anti-Russian step."
Ukrainian officials
claimed that the restrictions were not a direct result of the Russian military
intervention in Georgia. Instead, they maintain that they had long sought to
regulate more effectively Russian operations at the Sevastopol base, but that
Moscow had repeatedly delayed commencing talks on the issue by arguing that it
had no plan to employ the Black Sea Fleet in foreign military operations.
Nevertheless, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry had stated at the onset of
the war that they would not necessarily allow Russian warships to return to
Sevastopol if they supported military operations against Georgia. "We have
information confirmed by our specialists that several vessels of the Black Sea
Fleet left Sevastopol and either made their way or were making their way toward
the territory of Georgia,"
Ukraine Foreign Minister Volodymyr Ohryzko explained while in Georgia on
Aug. 10. "Obviously, if this is confirmed we will have to reconsider the
conditions under which these vessels would be able to be stationed on the
territory of Ukraine."
On Aug. 13, moreover, the Ukrainian Security
Council issued a statement declaring that the presence of foreign warships in
its waters "poses a potential threat to Ukraine's national security,
particularly if parts of Russia's Black Sea Fleet are used against third
countries." The Ukrainian government has long insisted it will not renew
Russia's lease regarding Sevastopol when it expires on May 28, 2017.
For
their part, Russian officials denounced the Ukrainian government for siding with
Saakashvili, who Moscow holds responsible for starting the war and committing
war crimes against Russian citizens in South Ossetia.
After the Georgian War began, Sergei Shoigu, Russia's minister for
emergency situations, expressed indignation that, "One week before these events,
we send a column of humanitarian aid to Ukraine to help flood victims and the
next we find they're offering military aid, arms for the destruction of
civilians."
One month prior to the invasion, Ukrainian troops participated in a large,
multinational military exercise in Georgia, "Immediate Response 2008" which also
involved Azeri, Armenian and American soldiers.
After the war ended in
an overwhelming Russian military victory, former Georgian President Eduard
Shevardnadze, who as the last Soviet foreign minister helped dismantle the
Soviet Union -- a development that Putin called the "greatest geopolitical
catastrophe" of the 20th century -- warned that "Ukraine most likely'" would be
the next country to experience increased Russian military pressure to abandon
foreign and defense policies opposed by Moscow.
There are certainly many
disturbing parallels in the situations Ukraine and Georgia find themselves with
respect to Moscow. Pro-Western governments came to power following popular
revolutions in both countries -- in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004. Along
with Georgia, the Ukrainian government is seeking to join NATO.
At this April's NATO summit in Bucharest, the alliance's communiqué said
that both countries "will become NATO members" eventually. The Georgian and
Ukrainian governments also have collaborated to pursue energy transit routes
linking the Caspian Sea to Europe that bypass Russia.
Unfortunately,
Ukraine shares some of Georgia's vulnerabilities as well. The Ukrainian region
of Crimea has a majority Russian-speaking population. Some of its members would
like to join Russia. The peninsula also hosts an important naval base that
Russia does not want to relinquish.
The Kremlin might be able to instigate a pro-Russian uprising in the Crimea
in which the insurgents, following the South Ossetian precedent, would appeal
for Russian military intervention to protect them from Kiev.
Various
Russian leaders have suggested that, if Ukraine actually joins NATO or attempts
to expel the Russian Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol, then Russia might annex
the Crimea. After the Bucharest summit, Putin told a news conference that, "The
appearance on our borders of a powerful military bloc . . . will be considered
by Russia as a direct threat to our country's security."
Army Gen. Yury Baluyevsky, chief of the Russian General Staff, said that
the entry of Ukraine or Georgia into NATO would lead Moscow to "undoubtedly take
measures to ensure its security near the state border. These will be both
military and other measures."
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov likewise said Moscow "will do everything
possible to prevent the accession of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO." These
statements appear aimed at stoking tensions with Ukraine to exacerbate the
country's internal differences and reinforce West European reluctance to allow
Ukrainian entry into NATO.
Nevertheless, there are certain major
differences between Georgia and Ukraine. First, the Ukrainian armed forces are
much stronger than those of Georgia. Whereas Georgia's prewar military had
approximately 37,000 soldiers under arms, the Ukrainian military numbers over
200,000.
The Russian armed forces is still five times larger, but would find a war
with Ukraine, with a population -- which, though divided about NATO membership,
would presumably rally to defend Ukraine's territorial integrity -- some 10
times larger than that of Georgia, a much greater challenge.
In
addition, the United States and some other NATO countries have belatedly sought
to reinforce their political-military position in the former Soviet bloc. The
Bush administration appears to have accepted Saakashvili's warning that the weak
U.S. response to the Russian intervention was creating a situation in which
"America is losing the whole region" to Russia.
After days of supporting
the Georgian position with nothing but rhetoric, President Bush announced on
Aug. 13 that the U.S. military would conduct a relief operation in Georgia.
Whatever humanitarian assistance it might provide the Georgian people would pale
in significance to the deployment's symbolic importance as reaffirming
Washington's continuing role and interests in Russia's neighborhood.
The
announcement that NATO would hold a special meeting on the conflict, as well as
the long-awaited consummation of a Polish-American deal on basing U.S. missile
interceptors in Poland, also signaled that Washington and some of its allies
were now determined to shore up their presence in the region to dissuade further
Russian predations.
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3
. LIMITED LEVERAGE: EURASIA
AND THE WEST
OP-ED: William Horton
Beebe-Center
President, Eurasia Foundation, Washington, D.C.
International Herald Tribune (IHT), Paris, France, Friday, August 15,
2008
WASHINGTON: Even before the dust settles on the humanitarian tragedy
unfolding today in South Ossetia and the full extent of the damage is known, one
essential truth has emerged: The Caucasus region, Russia and indeed all the
nations that once comprised the Soviet Union are of crucial strategic interest
to the United States.
Witness the spike in oil prices within hours of the outbreak of
hostilities, concerns about oil pipeline safety, weapons proliferation, and the
fact that both U.S. presidential candidates devoted valuable campaign time to
this foreign policy issue.
Despite the region's importance, the current crisis has demonstrated
that the United States and Europe have disturbingly limited diplomatic leverage
in the Eurasia region.
Less than a week after Russia and Georgia started fighting, European
and American officials have actively begun shuttle diplomacy between Moscow and
Tbilisi and the results so far are positive but inconclusive. The fact remains
that similar initiatives in the past failed to prevent the outbreak of
hostilities, much less resolve the underlying conflict, and it is far from
certain that they will work any better this time.
This diplomacy deficit has many causes - including conflicting economic
and energy interests in the West, inconsistent policies of multilateral
organizations and regressive politics in many former Soviet states - but a major
cause is the limited investment of time and money in the region by many Western
nations since 2001.
The United States and European governments have neglected the quotidian
work of formal diplomatic relations as well as the informal connections that
constitute civil society. Unglamorous but essential, these formal and informal
relations are the ties that bind, especially when it comes to a crisis like the
one we faced this week in Georgia.
Preoccupied with other conflicts and increased demands on the Treasury,
the U.S. government in particular has reduced its foreign assistance to the
region each year for the last seven years, so that today financial support for
engagement between citizens and institutions in America and their counterparts
in the Eurasia region is one-half what it was in 2000.
Projects ranging from the improvement of local governments to small
business development to international education exchanges - activities that not
only help build prosperity and stability in the region, but also improve the
environment in which economic and diplomatic relations occur - are put at risk
by the sharp reduction in government financing.
This in a region of 12 rapidly developing countries - six of which are
secular Muslim nations - all of which are essential to managing some of the most
serious international challenges we face, from nuclear proliferation to energy
security to labor migration.
There is considerable political will today in the United States and
Europe to do something to contain the current crisis in Georgia and prevent the
outbreak of new ones in the many hotspots in the Eurasia region.
As leaders apply themselves to the deferred maintenance on formal relations
with the countries of Eurasia, they should not overlook the importance of
strengthening international engagement at the citizen level, the soft power
that, if stewarded properly, can help prevent conflict and help resolve
conflicts when they arise.
When the dust settles on the current crisis in the Caucasus, debate
over what precisely went wrong will no doubt continue for some time. One point
on which all should be able to agree is that engagement at the citizen level
must be fostered, and financed, to help avert future crises like the one in
Georgia and to extend the diplomatic reach of the governments concerned when
they do erupt.
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4
. UKRAINIAN ENVOY SAYS
GEORGIA A 'LESSON FOR UKRAINE'
Interview with Ukrainian
Deputy Prime Minister Hryhoriy Nemyria
By Maryana Drach, Kyiv, Ukraine
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
(RFE/RL)
Prague, Czech Republic, Friday, August 15, 2008
A Ukrainian government official has called on the European Union to help
Kyiv avoid a "security vacuum" like the one that led to the current conflict
between Russia and Georgia.
"For a very long time, it's been clear that there was a security vacuum in
the South Caucasus," Deputy Prime Minister Hryhoriy Nemyria said in an interview
with RFE/RL's Ukraine Service. "It's a lesson for Ukraine. Ukraine is the
largest post-Soviet country after Russia, and one that shares a long border with
the European Union. It can't be left in a similar vacuum."
Nemyria was speaking in Kyiv following three days in Tbilisi meeting with
Georgian officials and coordinating humanitarian aid shipments to the country.
Ukraine, a recent ally of Georgia since both countries' "colored
revolutions" brought pro-democratic leaders to office, has been staunch in its
support of Tbilisi since the start of Georgia's armed conflict with Russia over
the breakaway republic of South Ossetia.
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko joined a delegation of five Eastern
European leaders who traveled to the Georgia in a show of solidarity with
Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili, and Ukraine has warned that Russia would
face restrictions on if its Black Sea Fleet, which is based in the Ukrainian
port city of Sevastopol, was used in any aggressive actions against Georgia.
The posture has angered Russia, which often seems to regard both Ukraine
and Georgia as wayward neighbors that should be brought back into Moscow's
orbit. Kyiv and Tbilisi have actively sought membership in the NATO military
alliance, an aim that infuriates the Kremlin and is believed to have played a
significant role in Russia's military advance on Georgia.
Nemyria acknowledged the possibility that Russia might next turn its focus
to Ukraine. "I think old habits die hard," he said of Russia. "What we can see
in this overreaction is that there is a risk [for Ukraine]. And of course,
Ukraine has a frozen conflict on its own border" -- a reference to Moldova's
breakaway region of Transdniester, which like South Ossetia and a third
separatist region, Abkhazia, enjoys Moscow's strong support.
"We want to avoid a security vacuum that will be prone to a defrosting of
such a frozen conflict," he said. "European leaders must now realize that the
South Ossetia conflict has opened such a vacuum throughout the entire area that
Moscow sometimes calls its 'near abroad.' We welcome the EU's effort -- led by
France, and supported by Germany and others -- to be more visible as an actor in
the region."
Nemyria dismissed speculation that Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko -- who
has been notably silent on the current Georgia-Russia conflict -- is hoping to
secure Russia's support for a future presidential bid.
"The government of Ukraine adopted a clear position, the centerpiece of
which was the recognition and support of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Georgia," he said. "The president of Ukraine took the lead in
voicing the official Ukrainian position, and we felt no need to repeat it. Those
accusations against the prime minister are misplaced."
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5
. COULD UKRAINE BECOMES
RUSSIA'S NEXT TARGET?
By Peter Fedynsky, Moscow, VOA
Correspondent
Voice of America (VOA), Washington, D.C.,
Friday, August 15, 2008
The former Soviet republics of Georgia and Ukraine are allies engaged in
similar attempts to establish democratic rule, to join NATO and realign
themselves with the West, much to the displeasure of Russia.
During the conflict in Georgia, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko
prohibited ships from the Russian Black Sea Fleet that are engaged off the
Georgian coast from returning to port on Ukraine's Crimean peninsula without
Kyiv's official permission. VOA correspondent Peter Fedynsky examines how the
Kremlin may react to Ukraine's pro-Georgian and pro-Western position.
Ukraine's current President, Viktor Yushchenko flew to Tbilisi to join his
Georgian friend and fellow head of state, Mikheil Saakashvili, in the school's
re-dedication ceremony. Both men rode to power following mass
pro-democracy protests that came to be known as colored revolutions. Georgia's
was the Rose Revolution and Ukraine's was the Orange. Accordingly, the
Hrushevsky School was painted orange.
Moscow has not disguised its displeasure with the colored revolutions and
refuses to deal with Mr. Saakashvili. On Tuesday, President Yushchenko again
flew to Tbilisi, accompanied this time by the presidents of Poland, Latvia,
Lithuania and Estonia.
Mr. Yushchenko says the task of the presidential mission is to show that
Georgia is not alone, that in this age the power of reason should not be
replaced by the iron fist.
The Ukrainian leader says the five presidents came to Georgia to prohibit
the of killing people and the execution of the country.
Ukrainian military analyst Oleksiy Melnyk, of the Razumkov Center think
tank in Kyiv, told VOA the Polish, Ukrainian and Baltic leaders do not
necessarily agree with all of the actions undertaken in the conflict by
Georgian leadership, but notes they risked their own physical security to send a
signal to Moscow.
Melnyk says Moscow should see the presidential show of solidarity in
Tbilisi as a serious signal that Russian foreign policy of establishing control
over
former Soviet republics and its neighborhood achieves a totally
opposite effect. The analyst says Russia is surrounding itself with nations that
are, at a minimum, not friendly and perhaps even hostile toward Moscow.
Oleksiy Melnyk says Russian military actions in Georgia could lead the
majority of Ukrainians who now oppose to their country's NATO membership to
reassess their opinions about the respective security threats posed by the
Western alliance and Russia.
The chairman of the European Integration Forum in Tbilisi, Soso
Tsiskarishvili, agrees with Melnyk's assessment, but notes Ukraine is better
prepared to meets NATO's democratic standards for membership than Georgia.
Tsiskarishvili says Ukraine's two recent parliamentary elections and
Georgia's presidential and parliamentary contests differ from one another like
heaven and earth in terms of democratic and transparent procedures.
But Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer cautions that Ukraine could
be Russia's next target as part of what he says is a grand Kremlin plan for the
partial restoration of Russian greatness.
"Russia right now wants at least half of Ukraine to be annexed," said
Felgenhauer. "Vladimir Putin talked about that rather openly at the NATO summit
in Bucharest, Romania in April. Ukraine will disintegrate into two halves, and
we want the eastern half, including of course, first and foremost,
Crimea."
Felgenhauer says Ukraine's overwhelming vote for independence in 1991,
which included a majority of Crimeans, means nothing to Kremlin rulers, who the
analyst says do not respect the will of even their own people.
Nonetheless, the analyst says Russia is tied down in Georgia and will not
make any immediate military moves against Ukraine. He notes, however, that
Russia's Black Sea Fleet, which leases naval facilities in Sevastopol in
Crimea, will likely steam back to port in defiance of a Ukrainian presidential
order that it must first ask for Ukrainian permission.
"If Russia openly challenges Ukrainian sovereignty, I think that Ukraine
will then turn to the West and say, 'you know guys, they're challenging our
sovereignty with their fleet.' And this will happen without any kind of use
of arms, or anything made in anger. Ukraine right now, apparently wants to
make the threat to its sovereignty obvious to outside powers," said
Felgenhauer.
Felgenhauer says Moscow's vision of the world is that of Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin; one in which Russia and Washington share spheres of influence.
The analyst notes that Russia withdrew its bases from Cuba and Vietnam,
expecting the United States to stay away from what Moscow thought was to be its
sphere of influence. He says Moscow felt betrayed when Washington began
supporting colored revolutions among Russia's neighbors.
But Soso Tsiskarishvili points to this week's visit to Tbilisi by
presidents of five countries that border Russia as a sign that they do not trust
the
Kremlin.
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6
. AFTER RUSSIA'S INVASION
OF GEORGIA, WHAT NOW FOR THE WEST?
At least for now, the smoke seems to be clearing from the Georgian
battlefield.
But the extent of the wreckage reaches far beyond that small country.
COMMENTARY: By John R Bolton
Former US Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Telegraph,
London, UK, Friday, August 15, 2008
Russia’s invasion across an internationally recognised border, its
thrashing of the Georgian military, and its smug satisfaction in humbling one of
its former fiefdoms represents only the visible damage.
As bad as the bloodying of Georgia is, the broader consequences are
worse. The United States fiddled while Georgia burned, not even reaching the
right rhetorical level in its public statements until three days after the
Russian invasion began, and not, at least to date, matching its rhetoric with
anything even approximating decisive action. This pattern is the very definition
of a paper tiger.
Sending Secretary of State Condeleezza Rice to Tbilisi is touching, but
hardly reassuring; dispatching humanitarian assistance is nothing more than we
would have done if Georgia had been hit by a natural rather than a man-made
disaster.
The European Union took the lead in diplomacy, with results approaching
Neville Chamberlain’s moment in the spotlight at Munich: a ceasefire that failed
to mention Georgia’s territorial integrity, and that all but gave Russia
permission to continue its military operations as a “peacekeeping” force
anywhere in Georgia.
More troubling, over the long term, was that the EU saw its task as being
mediator – its favourite role in the world – between Georgia and Russia, rather
than an advocate for the victim of aggression.
Even this dismal performance was enough to relegate Nato to an entirely
backstage role, while Russian tanks and planes slammed into a “faraway country”,
as Chamberlain once observed so thoughtfully. In New York, paralysed by the
prospect of a Russian veto, the UN Security Council, that Temple of the
High-Minded, was as useless as it was during the Cold War.
In fairness to Russia, it at least still seems to understand how to
exercise power in the Council, which some other Permanent Members often appear
to have forgotten.
The West, collectively, failed in this crisis. Georgia wasted its dime
making that famous 3am telephone call to the White House, the one Hillary
Clinton referred to in a campaign ad questioning Barack Obama’s fitness for the
Presidency. Moreover, the blood on the Bear’s claws did not go unobserved in
other states that were once part of the Soviet Union.
Russia demonstrated unambiguously that it could have marched directly to
Tbilisi and installed a puppet government before any Western leader was able to
turn away from the Olympic Games. It could, presumably, do the same to them.
Fear was one reaction Russia wanted to provoke, and fear it has
achieved, not just in the “Near Abroad” but in the capitals of Western Europe as
well. But its main objective was hegemony, a hegemony it demonstrated by
pledging to reconstruct Tskhinvali, the capital of its once and no-longer-future
possession, South Ossetia. The contrast is stark: a real demonstration of using
sticks and carrots, the kind that American and European diplomats only talk
about.
Moreover, Russia is now within an eyelash of dominating the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, the only route out of the Caspian Sea region not
now controlled by either Russia or Iran. Losing this would be dramatically
unhelpful if we hope for continued reductions in global petroleum prices, and
energy independence from unfriendly, or potentially unfriendly, states.
It profits us little to blame Georgia for “provoking” the Russian
attack. Nor is it becoming of the United States to have anonymous officials from
its State Department telling reporters, as they did earlier this week, that they
had warned Georgia not to provoke Russia.
This confrontation is not about who violated the Marquess of Queensbury
rules in South Ossetia, where ethnic violence has been a fact of life since the
break-up of the Soviet Union on December 31, 1991 – and, indeed, long before.
Instead, we are facing the much larger issue of how Russia plans to behave
in international affairs for decades to come. Whether Mikhail Saakashvili
“provoked” the Russians on August 8, or September 8, or whenever, this rape was
well-planned and clearly coming, given Georgia’s manifest unwillingness to be
“Finlandized” – the Cold War term for effectively losing your foreign-policy
independence.
So, as an earlier Vladimir liked to say, “What is to be done?” There
are three key focal points for restoring our credibility here in America:
drawing a clear line for Russia; getting Europe’s attention; and checking our
own intestinal fortitude.
Whether history reflects Russia’s Olympic invasion as the first step toward
recreating its empire depends – critically – on whether the Bush Administration
can resurrect its once-strong will in its waning days, and on what US voters
will do in the election in November. Europe also has a vital role – by which I
mean the real Europe, its nation states, not the bureaucracies and endless
councils in Brussels.
[1] First, Russia
has made it clear that it will not accept a vacuum between its borders and the
boundary line of Nato membership. Since the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union
collapsed, this has been a central question affecting successive Nato membership
decisions, with the fear that nations in the “gap” between Nato and Russia would
actually be more at risk of Russian aggression than if they joined Nato.
The potential for instability and confrontation was evident.
Europe’s rejection this spring of President Bush’s proposal to start
Ukraine and Georgia towards Nato membership was the real provocation to Russia,
because it exposed Western weakness and timidity. As long as that perception
exists in Moscow, the risk to other former Soviet territories – and in
precarious regions such as the Middle East – will remain.
Obviously, not all former Soviet states are as critical to Nato as
Ukraine, because of its size and strategic location, or Georgia, because of its
importance to our access to the Caspian Basin’s oil and natural gas reserves.
Moreover, not all of them meet fundamental Nato prerequisites. But we must
now review our relationship with all of them. This, in effect, Nato failed to do
after the Orange and Rose Revolutions, leaving us in our present untenable
position.
By its actions in Georgia, Russia has made clear that its long-range
objective is to fill that “gap” if we do not. That, as Western leaders like to
say, is “unacceptable”. Accordingly, we should have a foreign-minister-level
meeting of Nato to reverse the spring capitulation at Bucharest, and to decide
that Georgia and Ukraine will be Nato’s next members.
By drawing the line clearly, we are not provoking Russia, but doing just
the opposite: letting them know that aggressive behaviour will result in costs
that they will not want to bear, thus stabilising a critical seam between Russia
and the West. In effect, we have already done this successfully with Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania.
[2] Second, the
United States needs some straight talk with our friends in Europe, which ideally
should have taken place long before the assault on Georgia. To be sure, American
inaction gave French President Sarkozy and the EU the chance to seize the
diplomatic initiative.
However, Russia did not invade Georgia with diplomats or roubles, but with
tanks. This is a security threat, and the proper forum for discussing security
threats on the border of a Nato member – yes, Europe, this means Turkey – is
Nato.
Saying this may cause angst in Europe’s capitals, but now is the time
to find out if Nato can withstand a potential renewed confrontation with Moscow,
or whether Europe will cause Nato to wilt. Far better to discover this sooner
rather than later, when the stakes may be considerably higher. If there were
ever a moment since the fall of the Berlin Wall when Europe should be worried,
this is it.
If Europeans are not willing to engage through Nato, that tells us
everything we need to know about the true state of health of what is, after all,
supposedly a “North Atlantic” alliance.
[3] Finally, the
most important step will take place right here in the United States. With a
Presidential election on November 4, Americans have an opportunity to take our
own national pulse, given the widely differing reactions to Russia’s blitzkrieg
from Senator McCain and (at least initially) Senator Obama. First reactions,
before the campaigns’ pollsters and consultants get involved, are always the
best indicators of a candidate’s real views.
McCain at once grasped the larger, geostrategic significance of Russia’s
attack, and the need for a strong response, whereas Obama at first sounded as
timorous and tentative as the Bush Administration. Ironically, Obama later moved
closer to McCain’s more robust approach, followed only belatedly by Bush.
In any event, let us have a full general election debate over the
implications of Russia’s march through Georgia. Even before this incident,
McCain had suggested expelling Russia from the G8; others have proposed blocking
Russia’s application to join the World Trade Organisation or imposing economic
sanctions as long as Russian troops remain in Georgia.
Obama has assiduously avoided specifics in foreign policy – other than
withdrawing speedily from Iraq – but that luxury should no longer be available
to him. We need to know if Obama’s reprise of George McGovern’s 1972 campaign
theme, “Come home, America”, is really what our voters want, or if we remain
willing to persevere in difficult circumstances, as McCain has consistently
advocated. Querulous Europe should hope, for its own sake, that America makes
the latter choice.
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NOTE:
John R Bolton is the former US Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
Currently a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, he
is the author of the recently published “Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending
America at the United Nations” (Simon & Schuster/Threshold
Editions.
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7
. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
(FDI) RISKS BECOMING A CASUALTY OF WAR
“We think that Ukraine may be
the next investment casualty..."
By Rachel Morajee in London, Financial
Times
London, UK, Friday, August 15 2008
Within hours of the ceasefire in Georgia, Heidelberg Cement reopened
its cement factories near Tblisi. The German company’s three cement plants
supply about 60 per cent of the country’s market and are one of Georgia’s
biggest foreign investments.
They have flourished thanks to a construction boom in Georgia and
neighbouring Azerbaijan and could be set to cash in on reconstruction. Brigitte
Fickel, a spokeswoman for Heidelberg Cement, said a plant warehouse was damaged
during Russian air raids but production had not been affected.
Damage to Georgia’s civilian and business infrastructure has been
minimal, but the brief conflict may have done serious harm to the outlook for
future foreign investment not just here but in other former Soviet states that
clash with Moscow.
“Georgia’s economic growth will be much reduced and foreign investment
that has been so important to Georgia’s fundamentals could be revised,” says
Olivier Descamps, a managing director at the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development. “We cannot say Georgia’s economy has been physically damaged.
But there is the matter of risk and the impairment of confidence.”
Ratings agencies Fitch and Standard & Poor’s both downgraded
Georgia after fighting broke out and warned that the end of combat operations
would not shield the country from the longer-term economic impact.
FDI flows are crucial to financing Georgia’s current account deficit
and have been a key driver of growth.
Foreign investment stood at 19.8 per cent of GDP in 2007 compared with
13.9 per cent in 2006, according to the Tbilisi government. Georgia attracted
more than $2bn (Euro1.3bn, lbs1.06bn) in FDI last year mainly in banking, real
estate, mining and agriculture.
The conflict will have a macroeconomic impact in the short to medium
term but analysts say there is unlikely to be a clear-cut resolution to the
conflict between Georgia and Russia and political uncertainty could cloud
investment prospects.
While established projects will not be affected by the conflict, new
investors are likely to shy away from Georgia and other countries such as
Ukraine, which are seen as standing in Russia’s line of fire.
“We think that Ukraine may be the next investment casualty because it
was asked in a veiled fashion if it wants to join Nato and Russia’s actions hark
back to the cold war and the desire to retain spheres of influence on its
borders,” said Elizabeth Stephens, head of credit and political risk analysis at
Jardine Lloyd Thompson.
In Ukraine, FDI has also been a significant part of growth. Net FDI
stood at 7 per cent of GDP in 2007 up from 5.2 per cent in 2006, according to
the Kiev government.
The Baltic states have tighter trade links with Russia and export large
amounts of food as well as being a corridor for Russian exports to western
Europe, so are likely to be less affected by the conflict in Georgia, analysts
say.
Estonian exports to Russia doubled between 2005 and 2007 and as the
share of exports flowing east rose from 6.5 per cent to 8.9 per cent over the
period.
“I don’t think there will be a knock-on effect to the Baltic states.
They have had tense relations with Russia for some time but that is unlikely to
weigh heavily on investors decisions,” said Edward Parker at Fitch
Ratings.
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8
. POSSIBLE IMPACT OF THE
RUSSIA-GEORGIA CONFLICT
ON UKRAINE AND OTHER CIS
COUNTRIES
SigmaBleyzer, The Bleyzer
Foundation
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, August 12, 2008
The current military confrontation between Georgia and Russia is the result
of a prolonged dispute between these two countries over the future of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia’s desire to join NATO, against Russia’s wishes,
also played a role.
Many observers also believe that Russia’s strong use of power against
Georgia can be seen as an attempt to intimidate other countries – particularly
Ukraine, which declared its desire to join NATO and seek EU integration, and
Moldova with its ongoing conflict in Transnistria (Pridnestrovie).
Although it is very unlikely that the “Georgian scenario” can play out in
Ukraine, the situation may become more critical closer to 2017, when the lease
agreement for Russia’s fleet in Crimea terminates. Many political forces
in Ukraine believe that this agreement should not be renewed, a position that
would antagonize Russia.
CIS countries have achieved mixed performance in terms of building modern
democratic institutions. Aside from the Baltic States, Ukraine and Georgia are
the only two countries in the region considered to be fairly free and democratic
states by most international observers. Almost twenty years after the break-up
of the Soviet Union, less than one fifth of the 290 million people living in the
FSU enjoy healthy democracies.
Since Ukraine is a rapidly developing new democracy surrounded by several
non-democratic countries, including Russia, some Western countries may decide to
support the provision of additional safeguards for Ukraine. This might include
both fast-track negotiations for NATO membership and a clearer prospect for EU
membership.
However, other European countries with a higher dependency on Russian
energy resources may be more concerned with ensuring their own energy supply and
may not want to initiate any action that could annoy Russia.
A Brief Summary of the Georgian
Economy
Over the last five years, annual GDP growth in Georgia has been around 10%
yoy, with an impressive 12% yoy growth in 2007. This growth was mostly driven by
net inflows of foreign direct investments (FDI), which can be attributed to the
unprecedented improvement in the business environment. Indeed, net FDI grew from
8% of GDP in 2003 to 15% of GDP in 2007.
In the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Ranking for 2008, Georgia is
placed in 18th position worldwide (compared to 106th for Russia). Furthermore,
Georgia was listed among the top 10 reformers since it managed to improve
investor protection and visibly reduced the cost of starting a business. Still,
GDP per capita, which stood at $2,300 in 2007, is three times lower than in
Kazakhstan, four times lower than in Russia and 25% lower than in Ukraine.
Georgia runs a huge deficit in its international trade in goods, which
surged from around 15% of GDP in 2003 to nearly 30% of GDP in 2007. Exports
represent only 20% of GDP. Nevertheless, net FDI inflows financed 77% of
the $2 billion current account gap in 2007. With large capital inflows, the
foreign exchange reserves of the central bank doubled to $1.6 billion in 2007.
Georgia’s trade diversification by commodity is typical for a transition
economy with limited deposits of energy resources. In particular, beverages
(wines and bottled water), metal ores and transportation equipment are staple
export commodities, while petroleum products, cereals, machinery and
manufacturing goods are the main types of imported goods.
The geographical orientation of Georgia’s foreign trade is towards the CIS
economies (which account for 37% of Georgia’s international trade). The EU
accounts for 25% of Georgia’s trade, while the US represents 13%.
Within the CIS countries, Azerbaijan (which supplies petroleum products to
Georgia) and Armenia remain the main CIS markets for Georgian goods, accounting
for one fifth of all exports. Georgia ships only 4.3% of its exports to Russia
(compared to 24% in 2001), as Russia’s embargo on imports of Georgian goods
virtually closed access to the Russian market.
The recent military developments in Georgia may have significant effects on
the quality of the investment environment in Georgia, which, taking into account
the country’s dependence on FDI, may result in a material slowdown of the
economy and a collapse of its currency.
Impact of Georgia’s Conflict on the
Economy of Ukraine and Kazakhstan
The economic impact of the Russian-Georgian conflict on Ukraine and
Kazakhstan is likely to be minimal as the economic links between these countries
are quite modest. International trade and capital transactions with
Georgia constitute very small shares of the total transactions for these two
countries.
Ukraine’s merchandise exports to Georgia represent only 1% of Ukraine’s
total exports. About 50% of these exports are in iron and steel, food
products, and machinery and equipment. Ukraine’s imports from Georgia are
also negligible (0.2% of imports) and are mainly in wines and alcoholic
beverages. Trade in services is also small, at less that 1% of total
Ukrainian trade. Flows of capital, including FDI, are also less than 1% of
the total flows of Ukraine.
Kazakhstan is in a similar situation, with the share of Kazakhstan’s
international trade with Georgia at about 0.1% of Kazakhstan’s total trade
figures.
Reaction of Ukraine’s top
officials
On August 12th, President Yuschenko (accompanied by the Presidents of
Poland and Lithuania) flew to Georgia with the intention of assisting in the
peace talks. His visit to Georgia appears to be a diplomatic necessity to show
support for a friendly nation rather than a way to facilitate an effective
solution of this crisis. Other top Ukrainian officials have shown no (or rather
weak) reaction to the conflict.
The absence of a comment or response from the Ukrainian Prime Minister may
be explained by the fact that according to the Constitution of Ukraine, the
President is responsible for shaping the foreign policy of the country.
So far, the Head of the Parliament has made some trivial comments on the
superiority of a diplomatic resolution to this crisis. Moreover, taken into
account that leading political groups in Ukraine have opposing views on the
foreign policy of Ukraine (the main opposition is pro-Russian, while the
President wishes to see Ukraine joining NATO and the EU) it would be rather
difficult for the country to declare a clear position on the Russian-Georgian
conflict.
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9
. FITCH SEES WORSE
THREATS TO UKRAINE THAN RUSSIA ROW,
SERIES OF STRESSES IN UKRAINIAN
ECONOMY
By Peter Apps, Reuters, London, UK, Friday August 15 2008
LONDON - Credit ratings agency Fitch does not yet see rising tension
with Russia as a major threat to Ukraine's creditworthiness, it said on Friday,
but remains concerned about a series of stresses in the Ukrainian economy.
The aftermath of conflict between Georgia and Russia has seen a deepening
row between Ukraine and its larger neighbour over the use of a Ukrainian port by
Russia's Black Sea Fleet, prompting investors to price its debt as
riskier.
"It's not one of our key worries for the rating at
this stage," Fitch director of emerging Europe sovereigns Andrew Colquhoun. "We
are more worried about the current account deficit, rising external debt levels
and inflation."
He said that a small clash in the Black Sea that went no further might
not have too great an impact on Ukraine's current BB- rating with stable
outlook.
"But if you had escalation or even if a small clash simply prompted
capital flight then that would have a negative effect. Conflict would certainly
be negative but that is not something we see as very likely at this
stage."
Ukraine's hvrynia currency has been appreciating this year, but any
sudden shift in sentiment that prompted currency weakening would threaten both
inflation as well as the banking sector, with a lot of domestic private sector
debt in dollars and therefore hard to repay in the event of a major currency
move, he said.
He also warned Ukraine must do more to tackle inflation. "If inflation
stays at these levels in quite high double figures then that would add to risks
to the macroeconomy and possibly prompt negative ratings action," Colquhoun
said.
He said Fitch was also looking to the results of negotiations with
Russian state gas giant Gazprom over the price of gas supplies to Ukraine, a
process that may be impacted by worsening relations with Moscow. Ukraine
currently receives cheap gas from its neighbour, but supplies were briefly cut
off in early 2006 in another row.
"Negotiations with Gazprom have always been politicised," he said. "But
if the price of gas to Ukraine did suddenly increased to the same price for
European gas exports (from Russia) the economy would struggle to
cope."
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10
. UKRAINE CREDIT
DEFAULT SWAPS (CDS) WIDENS ON WORSENING RUSSIA
RELATIONS
Peter Apps, Reuters, London, UK, Thu Aug 14, 2008
LONDON - The cost of insuring Ukrainian government debt in the
credit default swaps market sharply increased on Thursday, with investors
increasingly worried about worsening relations with Russia.
Ukrainian
credit default swaps widened roughly 20 basis points to 437 on Thursday,
compared to 401 last Friday. Investors are concerned both over ongoing domestic
political worries and worsening relations with Russia over its conflict with
Georgia.
"It's a perfect storm for Ukraine at the moment," said
Commerzbank debt strategist Luis Costa. "The government has made it clear that
it is on a collision course with Russia and there are other issues as
well."
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11
. RUSSIA'S WAR
IS THE WEST'S CHALLENGE
OP-ED: By Mikheil Saakashvili, President of
Georgia
The Washington Post, Washington, D.C.
Thursday,
August 14, 2008; Page A17
TBILISI, Georgia -- Russia's invasion of Georgia strikes at the heart
of Western values and our 21st-century system of security. If the international
community allows Russia to crush our democratic, independent state, it will be
giving carte blanche to authoritarian governments everywhere. Russia intends to
destroy not just a country but an idea.
For too long, we all underestimated the ruthlessness of the regime in
Moscow. Yesterday brought further evidence of its duplicity: Within 24 hours of
Russia agreeing to a cease-fire, its forces were rampaging through Gori;
blocking the port of Poti; sinking Georgian vessels; and -- worst of all --
brutally purging Georgian villages in South Ossetia, raping women and executing
men.
The Russian leadership cannot be trusted -- and this hard reality
should guide the West's response. Only Western peacekeepers can end the war.
Russia also seeks to destroy our economy and is bombing factories,
ports and other vital sites. Accordingly, we need to establish a modern version
of the Berlin Airlift; the United Nations, the United States, Canada and others
are moving in this direction, for which we are deeply grateful.
As we
consider what to do next, understanding Russia's goals is critical. Moscow aims
to satisfy its imperialist ambitions; to erase one of the few democratic,
law-governed states in its vicinity; and, above all, to demolish the post-Cold
War system of international relations in Europe. Russia is showing that it can
do as it pleases.
The historical parallels are stark: Russia's war on Georgia echoes
events in Finland in 1939, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Perhaps
this is why so many Eastern European countries, which suffered under Soviet
occupation, have voiced their support for us.
Russia's authoritarian leaders see us as a threat because Georgia is a
free country whose people have elected to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic
community. This offends Russia's rulers. They do not want their nation or even
its borders contaminated by democratic ideas.
Since our democratic government came to power after the 2003 Rose
Revolution, Russia has used economic embargoes and closed borders to isolate us
and has illegally deported thousands of Georgians in Russia. It has tried to
destabilize us politically with the help of criminal oligarchs. It has tried to
freeze us into submission by blowing up vital gas pipelines in midwinter.
When all that failed to shake the Georgian people's resolve, Russia
invaded.
Last week, Russia, using its separatist proxies, attacked several
peaceful, Georgian-controlled villages in South Ossetia, killing innocent
civilians and damaging infrastructure.
On Aug. 6, just hours after a senior Georgian official traveled to
South Ossetia to attempt negotiations, a massive assault was launched on
Georgian settlements. Even as we came under attack, I declared a unilateral
cease-fire in hopes of avoiding escalation and announced our willingness to talk
to the separatists in any format.
But the separatists and their Russian masters were deaf to our calls
for peace. Our government then learned that columns of Russian tanks and troops
had crossed Georgia's sovereign borders. The thousands of troops, tanks and
artillery amassed on our border are evidence of how long Russia had been
planning this aggression.
Our government had no choice but to protect our country from invasion,
secure our citizens and stop the bloodshed. For years, Georgia has been
proposing 21st-century, European solutions for South Ossetia, including full
autonomy guaranteed by the international community. Russia has responded with
crude, 19th-century methods.
It is true that Russian power could overwhelm our small country --
though even we did not anticipate the ferocity and scale of Moscow's response.
But we had to at least try to protect our people from the invading forces. Any
democratic country would have done the same.
But facing this brutal invading army, whose violence was ripping
Georgia apart, our government decided to withdraw from South Ossetia, declare a
cease-fire and seek negotiations. Yet Moscow ignored our appeal for peace.
Our repeated attempts to contact senior Russian leaders were rebuffed.
Russia's foreign ministry even denied receiving our notice of cease-fire hours
after it was officially -- and very publicly -- delivered. This was just one of
many cynical ploys to deceive the world and justify further attacks.
This war threatens not only Georgia but security and liberty around the
world. If the international community fails to take a resolute stand, it will
have sounded the death knell for the spread of freedom and democracy everywhere.
Georgia's only fault in this crisis is its wish to be an independent,
free and democratic country. What would Western nations do if they were punished
for the same aspiration?
I have staked my country's fate on the West's rhetoric about democracy
and liberty. As Georgians come under attack, we must ask: If the West is not
with us, who is it with? If the line is not drawn now, when will it be drawn? We
cannot allow Georgia to become the first victim of a new world order as imagined
by Moscow.
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12
. WHY IS VLADIMIR PUTIN SO
SCARED OF GEORGIA?
OP-ED: By Anne Applebaum, Author,
Columnist
Telegraph, London, UK, Friday, August 8, 2008
'It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma." In recent
days, this famous Churchillian pronouncement on Russia has echoed through many
an analysis. In particular, Vladimir Putin - former Russian president, current
Russian prime minister, the man still clearly in charge of the country - has
been held up as a great puzzle.
What he wants; why he has
behaved so aggressively towards Georgia, a much weaker neighbour; why he seems
so angry at the West; all of this is widely considered unfathomable.
But in fact, Putin's mindset isn't really all that hard to understand:
Ever since he was first appointed prime minister by Boris Yeltsin in 1999, we've
known perfectly well who he is.
After all, one of the first things he did after taking that job was to
visit the Lubyanka, the former headquarters of the KGB and its most notorious
jail, now the home of the FSB, Russia's internal security services.
There - on the 82nd anniversary of the founding of the Cheka, Lenin's
secret police - he dedicated a plaque in memory of Yuri Andropov.
Andropov was director of the KGB for many years before briefly becoming, in
1982, general secretary of the Communist Party. Within Russia, however, he is
best remembered for his theory about how to reform the Soviet Union: to put it
bluntly, he believed that "order and discipline", as enforced by the methods of
the KGB - arrests of dissidents, imprisonment of corrupt officials, the
cultivation of fear - would restore the sagging fortunes of the Soviet economy.
There was no nonsense about "perestroika" or "glasnost", let alone
joining Western institutions. All of that clearly appealed to Putin, a former
secret policemen who first tried to join Andropov's KGB at the tender age of
15.
This is not to say that Putin is Stalin, or even Andropov, or that
Putin wants to bring back the Soviet Union. But it does mean that Putin, like
most of the people around him, is steeped in the culture of the old KGB.
He has a deep belief in the power of the state to control the life of
the nation: events cannot be allowed to just happen, they must be controlled and
manipulated.
He has a deep, professional wariness of people who believe otherwise:
At a very profound level, he does not believe that Russian citizens will make
good political or economic choices if left to their own devices.
In practice, this means that he does not believe that markets can - or
should be - genuinely open. He does not believe in unpredictable elections.
He does not believe that the modern equivalent of the Andropov-era
dissidents - the small band of journalists and activists who continue to oppose
centralised Kremlin rule - have anything important to say; on the contrary, he
assumes, as did his KGB predecessors, that anyone not loudly supportive of the
regime is a foreign spy.
At a rally in 2007, he declared that: "Unfortunately, there are still
those people in our country who act like jackals at foreign embassies … who
count on the support of foreign friends and foreign governments, but not on the
support of their own people."
This was a direct warning to Russia's few remaining human rights and
trade union activists, as they well understood. He continues to believe instead,
as Soviet secret policemen did before him, that all important decisions should
be made in Moscow by a small, unelected group of people who know how to resist
these foreign conspiracies.
Given his world view, it's not very surprising that Putin and his
entourage have been so openly hostile, not only towards Georgia, but also
towards Ukraine and Estonia, the post-Soviet countries that present the greatest
contrast to his vision of Russia.
These, after all, are countries in which genuine elections have taken
place - sometimes with the help of street demonstrations - and in which people
who have not been picked by the ruling oligarchy can rise to power.
In some cases, they have also moved much farther along the path of
genuine economic reform, and at least intend to create real market economies, in
which people who have not been picked by the ruling oligarchy can set up
businesses and make money.
It is not mere nationalism that makes leaders such as the Georgian
president, Mikheil Saakashvili, or the Ukrainian president, Viktor Yuschenko,
try to escape the political influence of Russia and to move closer to the West:
it is also the desire to make their countries more open, more liberal, more
authentically democratic.
In that sense, the war between Georgia and Russia really is
ideological, and not merely national in origin. Of course Russia retains "great
power" instincts, and of course some of the disdain the Russian media shows for
Saakashvili represents nothing more than a large country's dislike of defiance
from a small one. But the Russian leadership's dislike of Georgia also reflects
hatred - and fear - of the kind of democracy that Georgians have chosen.
Georgia's "Rose Revolution", like Ukraine's "Orange Revolution", is
precisely the kind of popular uprising that the Russian elite fears most deeply.
Putin's paranoia about Georgia is - unlikely though it may sound - at base a
paranoia about Russia itself.
What this means, of course, is that any Western support for the
Georgian cause will only increase Russian paranoia. And yet, at another level,
we have no choice: Western credibility is on the line here, too.
Any outright abandonment of Georgia to Putinist domination will be
correctly perceived - not only in the post-Soviet world, but also everywhere
else - as an abandonment of an ideological ally, of a country that has chosen,
at great cost, to join the West.
What we are left with, then, is not exactly a new Cold War, but an
unavoidable, possibly very long-term ideological battle with Russia, above and
beyond the normal economic and political competition.
We need to start thinking again about what it means to be "the West",
and about how Western institutions - not just Nato, but also the BBC World
Service, say, or the British Council - can be brought into the 21st century, not
merely to counter terrorism, but to argue the case for Western values, once
again.
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COMMENTARY & ANALYSIS: By Igor
Khrestin
Central Europe Digest, Center for European Policy Analysis
Washington, D.C., Friday, 15 August 2008
In all likelihood,
the recent crisis in Georgia has sunk that country’s chance to enter NATO
anytime soon. But as analysts spar over whether Georgia’s NATO aspirations
played a decisive role in precipitating the conflict, Ukraine’s entry looms ever
larger on NATO’s agenda.
With full view of Russia’s aggressive and disproportionate response to the
South Ossetian crisis, will Ukraine be offered a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at
the forthcoming meetings of the Alliance in December 2008 or April 2009?
Whereas Germany and France are routinely accused of “blocking” Ukraine’s
MAP in Bucharest, ostensibly in response to Vladimir Putin’s hectoring and
NATO’s unpopularity among Ukrainians, it is domestic instability and
indecisiveness of the Orange Coalition of President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko that are the real culprits.
Given the right political will in Kiev, Ukraine’s chances of receiving
MAP by next year are actually rather high. The Bucharest Summit last April ended
with a joint statement that in unequivocal terms declared that “We agreed today
that these countries [Ukraine and Georgia] will become members of NATO.”
At the most recent meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission on June 16, NATO
leaders yet again praised Ukraine’s participation in joint military operations
and maneuvers. Though a number of reforms are yet to be implemented, the general
consensus is that Ukraine has so far “punched above its weight” in cooperating
with the Alliance.
Thus, if Yushchenko and Tymoshenko manage to put their differences aside –
and if necessary, risk their political careers – the Russia factor and low
public support should not present a significant hurdle to Ukraine’s NATO
aspirations.
Before the outbreak of recent hostilities in the Caucasus, Western
leaders generally agreed that for all of Russia’s intransigence – ranging from
the emotional incantations of a brotherly nation “losing its sovereignty” to
brazen threats to aim missiles at that same brotherly nation – the
Putin/Medvedev ruling tandem are scarcely interested in starting a new Cold War,
even over Ukraine. That assumption will now undergo a significant rethinking in
the West – and clearly not to Russia’s benefit.
Moreover, with Putin’s recent comments to President Bush that “Ukraine is
not even a country” and Moscow mayor Yury Luzhkov’s dogged insistence that
Crimea is living on borrowed time as a part of Ukraine, one might think the
Ukrainian elites – whether from L’viv, Kiev, or Donetsk – should realize that
the real threat to their sovereignty lies to the East, not the West.
As the recent Georgia crisis was a direct result of longstanding and
festering “frozen conflicts” in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Ukrainian elites
must now begin considering the frightening repercussions of allowing Crimea – or
even the Black Sea port of Sevastopol – to descend into such muddy waters.
As for public opinion, NATO membership should generally not be a matter
of broad public acquiescence, but of a conscious geopolitical choice by a
consolidated national elite. As part of NATO’s post-Soviet expansion, only
Slovenia and Hungary have held referendums on membership – and Hungary’s was
nonbinding. Slovakia’s 1997 referendum was declared invalid, as it gathered only
10 percent of eligible voters.
Yet, NATO detractors in Ukraine and abroad often showcase their greatest
“counterpoint”: domestic public opinion polls, which routinely show only a
minority support for entry. For instance, a poll conducted in June 2008 by the
Fund for Public Opinion reported that 55 percent of Ukrainian respondents were
against NATO membership, with only 22 percent in favor.
Meanwhile, the Ukrainian government recently approved a four-year, $6
million “information campaign” to improve NATO’s image. While the jury is still
out regarding its effectiveness, even with the best of PR campaigns and outreach
programs, the West by now has generally accepted the uncomfortable fact that
NATO may never gain broad popularity among Ukrainians, especially in the eastern
regions of the country.
Yet, the matter is wrapped up in domestic politics; President Yushchenko
signed an agreement (the National Unity Declaration) in 2006 with then-Prime
Minister Viktor Yanukovych, which stipulated a popular referendum before any
decision can be taken on NATO membership.
The last real push for NATO membership by the Orange Coalition came
early this year. In January, President Yushchenko, Prime Minister Tymoshenko,
and Speaker of the Rada (Ukraine’s parliament) Arseniy Yatsenyuk sent a letter
to NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, reaffirming Ukraine’s
commitment to join the Alliance.
When the letter became public, the opposition (Yanukovych’s Party of
Regions and the Communist Party) blocked parliamentary work until March 6,
relenting only after Yushchenko openly threatened to dissolve the parliament
once again.
The deputies returned to work, but not until a resolution stating that “a
decision on an international agreement on Ukraine joining NATO shall be taken
only as a result of a national referendum” passed by 248 votes in the 450-seat
body. Given that the Orange Coalition actually holds a slim two-seat majority,
the vote clearly showcased the lack of commitment and party discipline for the
Yushchenko/Tymoshenko camp.
After this latest victory for the opposition, it became politics as
usual in Ukraine. Gearing up for the 2010 presidential elections, Yushchenko and
Tymoshenko remain perennially locked in domestic political battles. After
Tymoshenko secured an agreement on gas prices with Gazprom in late July, the
Prime Minister has been less willing to openly antagonize Russia on NATO
membership.
Despite Yushchenko’s continued vociferous support for the MAP and a
constitutional mandate to handle foreign policymaking, he has recently become
embroiled in a high-profile public battle with his former political ally David
Zhvania, whom Yushchenko accuses of instigating his September 2004 dioxin
poisoning.
In addition, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko disagree on about every other
domestic issue of relevance to Ukrainian voters: from rampant inflation to
the best way to handle the recent horrific floods in the western part of the
country.
In short, Ukraine’s political elites lack the political courage and
conviction to put aside petty political squabbles to ensure what would amount to
a momentous geopolitical breakthrough for their country. The Russia-Georgia war
does not change that. Those lambasting Berlin and Paris would do well to
re-direct some of their criticism towards Kiev itself.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTE:
Igor Khrestin is an analyst and writer specializing in Russian and East European
affairs based in Washington, DC. The views expressed in this article are those
of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Center for
European Policy Analysis.
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14
. UKRAINE UNSETTLED
BY RUSSIA'S INVASION OF GEORGIA
By BRIAN BONNER, Special
Correspondent, McClatchy Newspapers
The Herald Tribune, Rock
Hill, South Carolina, Friday, August 15, 2008
Russia's invasion of
Georgia has unsettled this former Soviet republic, which like Georgia has
applied for membership in NATO but now fears that the U.S. could do little to
prevent similar Russian action here.
"If the West swallows the pill and
forgives Russia the Georgian war, the invasion of 'peacekeeping tanks' into
Ukraine will just be a matter of time," Oleksandr Suchko, the research director
of the Kiev-based Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, wrote on Ukrainska
Pravda (Ukrainian Truth),
a leading online news site.
Still, not
everyone here thinks that Russia would invade Ukraine, which is nearly nine
times larger than Georgia, 10 times more populous and much better armed. Many
note, moreover, that Ukraine's president, Viktor Yushchenko, is highly unpopular
and isn't expected to win re-election in 2010.
There are many disputes between the countries, however.
Ukraine
has a long-standing issue with the presence of Russia's Black Sea Fleet at
Sevastopol, a holdover from when Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union, which
collapsed in 1991. Many in Ukraine want the Russians gone in 2017, when the
lease agreement expires, but Russia has been suggesting that it intends to stay
longer.
Russian politicians also provoke Ukrainian ire by reminding them
that the Crimean peninsula was a gift from Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in
1954,
giving rise to fears that Moscow might stoke secessionist sentiments in
the area, which is part of Ukraine but inhabited predominantly by ethnic
Russians.
Other supposed slights fan tensions.
One that burns, though perhaps
apocryphal, is a supposed conversation between Russia's then-President Vladimir
Putin and President Bush during the
April NATO-Russia Council summit in
Bucharest, Romania, at which the membership applications of Ukraine and Georgia
were delayed.
Putin supposedly told Bush that "Well, you understand,
George, Ukraine isn't even a state," according to Russia's newspaper Kommersant,
citing a
diplomatic source in attendance.
Many here suspect Russian
involvement in the still-unsolved and nearly fatal dioxin poisoning of
Yushchenko, who fell ill while he was a presidential
candidate in 2004. The
Kremlin backed his rival, Viktor Yanukovych, whose path to power was blocked
when the democratic Orange Revolution overturned the results of a rigged
election.
Yushchenko flew to Tbilisi, Georgia's capital, earlier this
week in a show of support for Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, and said
Thursday that Russia must seek Ukraine's permission before moving its warships
out of port. Russian leaders responded by saying they'd ignore
Yushchenko.
The two countries also have an ongoing dispute over the price
of natural gas. Ukraine is heavily dependent on Russian energy supplies, as is
much of
Europe, while Russia depends on Ukraine's transit pipelines to carry
its gas to customers in other nations.
Even religion is a source of
friction in the mainly Orthodox Christian countries. The most recent spat came
during last month's events celebrating the 1,020th anniversary of the conversion
from paganism to Christianity of Kyivan Rus, the medieval empire from which the
modern nations of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus arose.
Yushchenko irritated
Moscow by asking Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople, the nominal leader of
the world's Orthodox faithful, to recognize a single Orthodox Church in Ukraine.
Currently, Ukrainians are divided, with millions of faithful still loyal to
Russian Patriarch Alexei II.
Still, many here also have a hard time
imagining a Russian-Ukrainian military conflict.
Ukrainians and Russians
share centuries of Slavic kinship - Georgians have a separate cultural history -
and rule by czars and Soviets. Ukrainians, stuck
between Hitler and Stalin
during World War II, are accustomed to navigating unfavorable geographic
positions. Moreover, some 8 million of Ukraine's 46
million people are ethnic
Russians.
Polls show that Ukrainians are divided over the prospect of
NATO membership, with many opposed and others ambivalent. That ambivalence is
clear in
interviews.
"Russia will never invade Ukraine, not even for
Sevastopol," said Sergei Ribak, a security guard in Kiev. "This thesis is
ridiculous." Others aren't so sure, but draw different conclusions about what
Ukraine's foreign policy should be.
"I agree that, under certain
circumstances, a Russian invasion of Ukraine is possible," said Elena Guzva, a
Kiev homemaker. "That's why Ukraine should be
more serious about maintaining
balanced and friendly relations with our eastern neighbor in order to avoid the
risk."
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15. UKRAINE'S PRESIDENT WANTS NEW RUSSIAN FLEET
DEAL
The Associated Press, Kiev, Ukraine, Saturday, August 16, 2008
KIEV, Ukraine: Ukraine's president has urged Russia to work out an accord
on using its Ukraine-based Black Sea Fleet for military purposes. Viktor
Yushchenko says Russia's use of the fleet in fighting in neighboring Georgia
"showed how Ukraine can be very easily dragged ... into an international
conflict against its will."
Under a 1997 lease agreement, Russia's Black Sea Fleet can remain in its
historic base in the Crimean port of Sevastopol through 2017. On Wednesday,
Ukraine restricted movements of the fleet's ships in response to Russian
incursions into Georgia, prompting Russian criticism.
Yushchenko said in a statement on his Web site Friday that he asked his
Russian counterpart to launch talks on an accord about the
fleet.
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16
. SEVASTOPOL PRO-RUSSIAN
PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS PREPARE MAGNIFICENT WELCOME OF RUSSIAN VESSELS COMING BACK
FROM GEORGIA "WITH VICTORY"
UkrInform - Ukraine News, Kyiv, Ukraine, Friday, August 15, 2008
KYIV - Sevastopol activists of pro-Russian public organizations and
parties established duty on the raid for meeting the vessels of the Russian
Black Sea Fleet. According to head of the Russian People's Assembly of
Sevastopol Oleksandr Kruhlov, the meeting will be magnificent, with flowers and
music.
“The whole Sevastopol should find out that squadron is coming back at
once and should participate in welcoming,” Kruhlov said. “The ships are
returning not only with victory, they participated in saving civilians of South
Ossetia from Georgian genocide!”
The group of Russian ships which participated in making Georgia accept
peace includes guided weapon cruiser Moskva, guard-ship Smetlivyi, three big
assault ships, small guided missile ships and anti-submarine ships, support
vessels.
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17
. RUSSIA'S OMINOUS NEW
DOCTRINE?
OP-ED: By Strobe Talbott, President, Brookings
Institution
Deputy Secretary of State, Clinton
Administration
The Washington Post, Washington, D.C., Fri, Aug 15, 2008; Page
A21
Russia has been justifying its rampage through Georgia as a
"peacekeeping" operation to end the Tbilisi government's "genocide" and "ethnic
cleansing" of South Ossetia. That terminology deliberately echoes U.S. and NATO
language during their 1999 bombing campaign against Serbia, which resulted in
the independence of Kosovo.
Essentially, it's payback time for a
grievance that Russia has borne against the West for nine years. The Russians
are relying on the conceit that Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili is
today's equivalent of Slobodan Milosevic, and that the South Ossetians are (or
were until their rescue by the latter-day Red Army last week) being victimized
by Tbilisi the way the Kosovar Albanians suffered under Belgrade.
This analogy turns reality, and history, upside down. Only after exhausting
every attempt at diplomacy did NATO go to war over Kosovo. It did so because the
formerly "autonomous" province of Serbia was under the heel of Belgrade and the
Milosevic regime was running amok there, killing ethnic Albanians and throwing
them out of their homes. By contrast, South Ossetia -- even though it is on
Georgian territory -- has long been a Russian protectorate, beyond the reach of
Saakashvili's government.
An accurate comparison between the
Balkan disasters of the 1990s and the one now playing out in the Caucasus
underscores what is most ominous about current Russian policy. Seventeen years
ago, the Soviet Union came apart at the seams more or less peacefully. That was
overwhelmingly because Boris Yeltsin insisted on converting the old
inter-republic boundaries into new international ones.
In doing
so, he kept in check the forces of revanchism among communists and nationalists
in the Russian parliament (which went by the appropriately atavistic name "the
Supreme Soviet").
Meanwhile, Yugoslavia collapsed into bloody chaos because its leaders
engaged in an ethnically and religiously based land-grab. Milosevic, as the
best-armed of the lot, tried to carve a "Greater Serbia" out of the flanks of
Bosnia and Croatia.
If Yeltsin had gone that route, seeking to
create a Greater Russia that incorporated Belarus and the parts of Ukraine,
northern Kazakhstan and the Baltic states populated by Russian speakers, there
could have been conflict across 11 time zones with tens of thousands of nuclear
weapons in the mix.
A question that looms large in the wake of the past week is whether Russian
policy has changed with regard to the permanence of borders. That seemed to be
what Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was hinting yesterday when he said,
"You can forget about any discussion of Georgia's territorial integrity." He
ridiculed "the logic of forcing South Ossetia and Abkhazia to return to being
part of the Georgian state."
Lavrov is a careful and experienced diplomat, not given to shooting off his
mouth. That makes his comments all the more unsettling. If he has given the
world a glimpse of the Russian endgame, it's dangerous in its own right and in
the precedent it would set. South Ossetia and Abkhazia might be set up as
supposedly independent countries ("just like Kosovo," the Russians would say) --
but would in fact be satrapies of Russia.
While Russia might see
that outcome as proof of its comeback as a major power, the Balkanization of the
Caucasus may not end there: Chechnya is just one of several regions on Russian
territory that are seething with resentment against the Kremlin and that might
hanker after a version of independence far less to Moscow's liking than what may
be contemplated for Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Among Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's important tasks in the days
ahead is to get clarity on whether a Lavrov doctrine has replaced the Yeltsin
one of 16 years ago. If so, big trouble looms -- including for Russia. Moscow's
action and rhetoric of the past week have highlighted yet another, potentially
more consequential respect in which this episode could bode ill for all
concerned.
For the Bush administration -- and those of Bill
Clinton and George H.W. Bush as well -- the fundamental premise of American
policy has been that Russia has put its Soviet past behind it and is committed,
eventually, to integrating itself into Europe and the political, economic and
ideological (as opposed to the geographical) "West."
Prominent Russians have said as much. In one of my first meetings with
Vladimir Putin, before he became president, he spoke of his country's
zapadnichestvo, its Western vocation. Yet it now appears that beyond the
undisguised animosity that Putin bears toward Saakashvili, he and his government
regard Georgia's pro-Western bent and its aspiration to join two Western
institutions, NATO and the European Union, as, literally, a casus belli.
If that is the case, the next U.S. administration -- the fourth to
deal with post-Soviet Russia -- will have to reexamine the underlying basis for
the whole idea of partnership with that country and its continuing integration
into a rule-based international community.
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18
. PRESIDENT VICTOR
YUSHCHENKO SAYS UKRAINE SUPPORTS UNCONDITIONAL TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF GEORGIA
AS IT
EQUALIZES SUCH GEORGIAN
THREAT & OWN
SOVEREIGNTY
UkrInform - Ukraine News, Kyiv, Ukraine, Friday, August 15, 2008
KYIV - We really went through most likely the most terrifying ten
days of our contemporary history as for the first time over 17 years the war
started between the countries which formed the Soviet Union in past, Ukrainian
President Viktor Yushchenko noted in the comment published on his official
web-site. He proposes to make some conclusions from this “unexampled situation”
which can not leave Ukraine indifferent.
[1] The first
conclusion lies in the fact that each national security and
defense model can not ensure all-sufficient reply to the national
sovereignty.
Viktor Yushchenko is convinced that all that happened in Georgia is a
bright example how easily military operations, violation of territorial
integrity in present conditions can be transferred to any territory if it is not
supported by the system, mechanisms of collective guarantees. “In other words,
without guarantees any territory may run the danger of such actions,” he
notes.
[2] Second,
“providing adequate national sovereignty, integrity of our border may be ensured
only in one way - Ukraine's drifting to the system of collective security,” the
president underscores, noting that he mentions the need to fight but not the one
to fight with.
“Only the system of collective security will guarantee anyone,
including Ukraine, the highest international standards which probably could
prevent from some actions including the ones that occurred on August 7-8 first
on the territory of South Ossetia and later on other Georgian territories,” he
underscores.
Confirming that Ukraine supported and still supports the principle of
territorial integrity and sovereignty of any countries regardless of who started
aggression or who settled a conflict, Viktor Yushchenko reminded that, in fact,
Europe came out of World War II in 1975 when the Helsinki Final Act was
adopted.
If now territorial integrity of any country is challenged by anyone “so
we are facing the beginning of deep serious military actions,” he considers. So,
Ukraine should support Georgian territorial integrity and state sovereignty”,
this issue should not be discredited in our polemics and in our
discussion”.
The president equalizes the threat for the territorial integrity of any
European country and revision of Ukrainian territorial integrity. “We support
Georgian territorial integrity and its sovereignty because we stand for
Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty,” he emphasizes.
He opposes to appeals of some politicians to keep neutrality on this
issue as it is “the safest position”.
The president reminded that on August 9, Ukraine formed its vision of
immediate termination of the conflict and expressed it by diplomatic channels of
the EU countries. “With this, we wanted to say that we may be the party that
will actively participate in democratic settlement of this conflict,” the
president said.
Touching upon his settlement plan which envisages suspension of arms,
withdrawal of troops of the parties to the zones of their previous disposition,
humanitarian assistance and unconditional recognition of Georgian territorial
integrity, the president stressed that the tripartite peacemaking mission which
acted in Georgia “is ineffective”. So, the peacemaking corps should be
internationalized.
“And surely, Ukraine is ready to direct particular number of
peacemakers for this peacemaking operation under the relevant international
mandate”.
The president is convinced that the facts that a part of the Russian
Black Sea Fleet temporarily located in Ukraine partook in blocking Georgian
marine water area demonstrated “how easily, without agreement and desire of
Ukraine it can be drawn into, in passive meaning of this word, any international
conflict.
The president said that he sent a proposal to his Russian counterpart
to start immediate talks on coordination of similar situations by a separate
agreement which should ensure Ukraine's national security.
For this purpose he issued decrees on peculiarities of crossing
Ukrainian territorial waters and state border by subdivisions of the Russian
Black Sea Fleet. “It is not about attitude to somebody. It is about attitude to
the policy of national security,” he underscored.
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19
. UKRAINIAN
GOVERNMENT EXPRESSES STRONG SUPPORT FOR GEORGIA
Will Ukraine be next after Georgia?
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Taras
Kuzio
Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 5, Issue 154
The Jamestown Foundation, Wash. D.C., Tuesday, August 12,
2008
Ukraine’s president and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which comes
under his jurisdiction, have reacted sharply to the Georgian-Russian conflict.
President Viktor Yushchenko has close personal relations with President Mikhail
Saakashvili with whom he is direct contact on a daily basis
(
www.president.gov.ua, August
9).
The Yushchenko-Saakashvili relationship is a political alliance based
on the shared aims of the 2003 Rose and 2004 Orange revolutions, a common desire
to join NATO and support for an alternative to Russia energy sources through the
GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) regional group.
Ukraine and Georgia have also supported pro-U.S. positions in the UN on
Belarus’s human rights record and in the CIS through the Community of Democratic
Choice created in 2005. Ukraine and Georgia contributed the third largest
military forces to the US-led intervention in Iraq (Ukraine until 2005 and
Georgia since 2006).
Ukraine’s parliament, which is in summer recess, is
a different matter. The two orange forces (the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc and Our
Ukraine-Peoples Self Defense [Nuns]) follow the president’s line in support of
Georgia’s position.
Meanwhile, the Party of Regions (PR) and the Communist Party (KPU) hold
positions that are not sympathetic to Georgia, at times pro-Russian and at other
times contradictory and duplicitous.
The PR and KPU have both demanded an
investigation into Ukrainian supplies of arms to Georgia. The KPU has accused
the Ukrainian authorities of having armed the Saakashvili regime and has
described Saakashvili as an “international criminal.”
Such accusations
and inflammatory rhetoric echo those emanating from Moscow and the South
Ossetian and Abkhaz separatists. Russian and separatist leaders have accused
Ukraine of assisting alleged Georgian “ethnic cleansing” of South Ossetia and of
“arming the Georgian army to the teeth.” The Georgian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs defended Ukraine by accusing Russia of having armed the separatists
(Ukrayinska Pravda, August 9-10).
These accusations ignore the fact that
“military-technical cooperation between Ukraine and Georgia, which has taken
place over the last 15 years, has been within the parameters of international
law” (Zerkalo Nedeli, August 9).
Ukrainian supplies of military equipment to Georgia began during Leonid
Kuchma’s presidency, and continued under the government of PR leader Viktor
Yanukovych from 2002 to 2004. Ukrainian troops were sent to Iraq by the same
Yanukovych government.
The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry’s demand that
Russia withdraw its troops and respect Georgia’s territorial integrity is an
established position articulated under Kuchma. Ukraine’s offer of acting as a
mediator is again a long-standing proposal that was rejected by Russia under
Kuchma and again now (Ukrayinska Pravda, August 8-9).
Former U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke’s comment that Russia’s next
objective would be Ukraine is a fear long held in Kyiv. The initial impetus for
creating the GUAM group in 1998 was that of Russian-backed separatism in three
of its members (Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan) and a threat to the Crimea. The
Russian parliament continually laid claim to the Crimea and Sevastopol in the
1990s, the island of Tuzla in 2003 and to Sevastopol as recently as May
l.
Ukraine’s unease at Russia’s continued territorial demands led to a
presidential decree ordering the government to prepare legislation and conduct
negotiations with Russia on a full withdrawal of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF)
personnel by 2017. BSF personnel, who are Russian citizens, have illegally
participated in anti-NATO and pro-separatist rallies.
Russian
nationalist, Communist and pro-regime politicians are unanimous in using the
Crimea and Sevastopol as a potential bargaining chip to halt Ukraine’s NATO
membership. This reflects long-standing Russian views as expressed by President
Vladimir Putin at the April NATO-Russia Council that the alleged “fragility” of
Ukraine would cause it to disintegrate if it joined NATO (Zerkalo Nedeli, April
19).
Crimean KPU leader Leonid Grach threatened to support the
peninsula’s secession from Ukraine if it joined NATO. The view was criticized by
the head of the parliamentary Committee on European Integration and deputy
leader of the Nuns faction Borys Tarasyuk (
www.nuns.com.ua, August 8).
Crimea’s Communists, which are a regional branch of the KPU, played a
positive role in the 1990s in supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity and
adopting the 1998 pro-autonomy constitution.
The Simferopol city council
voted on July 24 to declare itself a “‘territory free from NATO.” The vote was
supported by the “For Yanukovych” faction and the national Bolshevik-oriented
Natalia Vitrenko bloc. The PR would lose votes in eastern Ukraine if it began to
play, like the KPU and Vitrenko bloc, with separatism.
Russian Communist
leader Gennady Zyuganov arrived in the Crimea during the Ossetian crisis to hold
negotiations with Crimean Communists on a “joint anti-NATO struggle.” Zyuganov
said the Saakashvili regime was undertaking “state terrorism” with the support
of the United States and NATO (UNIAN, August 9). Zyuganov supported the
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and has long supported Sevastopol’s
transfer to Russia.
The stakes are high for Yushchenko and Ukraine in the
Ossetian crisis. The removal or weakening of the Saakashvili regime would
undermine the Ukrainian-Georgian partnership, destroy the GUAM group (which
already has a passive Moldova) and thereby neutralize the pro-Western wing of
the CIS.
Ultimately, the most important impact of the crisis will be on the December
meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers set to review Ukraine and Georgia’s
“‘progress,” held at a time of regime change in the United States.
The
two arguments against admitting Ukraine and Georgia to NATO--political
instability in Ukraine and Georgia’s military conflict with Russia--have become
stronger since they were raised by Germany and France at the April Bucharest
NATO summit. It is therefore unlikely that the review meeting will send a
positive signal to Ukraine and Georgia about being granted NATO MAPs.
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20
. UKRAINE AND THE CONFLICT
IN SOUTH OSSETIA
Ukraine threatens to prevent return of
Russian Black Sea Fleet vessels
COMMENTARY
& ANALYSIS: By Roman Kupchinsky, Analyst, Writer
Eurasia
Daily Monitor, Volume 5, Issue 153
The Jamestown Foundation, Wash. D.C., Monday, August 11, 2008
In the morning of August 10, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
informed its Russian counterpart that in order to prevent Ukraine from being
drawn into an armed conflict, Ukraine might take measures to prevent the Russian
Black Sea Fleet (RBSF) vessels from returning to their base in Sevastopol in the
Crimea if they were involved in combat operations against Georgia. This ban
might last until the conflict in South Ossetia is “regulated,” the website of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine stated.
Two days earlier, on
August 8, the, troop landing ship Yamal left Sevastopol for the Russian port of
Novorossiysk, according to a report on the
www.proUA.com website which also noted
that a large contingent of ships from the RBSF that had taken part in the
military exercise Caucasus-2008 in late July did not return to Sevastopol but
remained in Novorossiysk (www.proUA.com, August 10).
Western media
reported that on the night of August 9, Russian troops had been put ashore from
warships into the disputed territory of Abkhazia.
On August 9 the
flagship of the RBSF, the cruiser Moskva, with the commanding admiral of the
fleet, Alexander Kletskov aboard, sailed from Sevastopol. It was accompanied by
the destroyer Smetlivy and the anti-submarine ships Muromets and the
Aleksandrovets, along with an assortment of support vessels.
As the
situation on the ground in South Ossetia rapidly deteriorated, Georgian National
Security Council Secretary Alexander Lomaia told the media that the Russian navy
was blocking Georgian ports and preventing ships laden with grain and fuel from
entering. Meanwhile, Interfax reported that "The navy was ordered not to allow
supplies of weapons and military hardware into Georgia by sea."
On August
10, however, Novosti Press Agency quoted an unnamed, highly placed source in the
General Staff of the Russian navy as saying that the role of the RBSF in the
conflict was to merely “provide aid to refugees” and strongly denied that
Russian ships were blockading the Georgian coast. “A blockade of the coast would
mean that we were at war with Georgia…which we are not,” the source was quoted
as saying.
The question of what type of humanitarian role the cruiser
Moskva, armed with 16 cruise missiles, torpedoes and an assortment of other
sophisticated weaponry, could play was not raised.
Ukraine’s threat
elicited a quick response from the Russian side. Anatoly Nagovitsin, the deputy
head of the General Staff of the Russian armed forces, was quoted by UNIAN press
agency on August 10 as saying that the Ukrainian statement “needed reworking,”
adding that thus far the RBSF was not engaged in military actions against
Georgian ships but that this could possibly change along with the
situation.
Later that day, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gregory
Karasin told a press conference in Moscow that the Russian foreign ministry
would begin talks with Ukraine on the return of the RBSF to Sevastopol, adding
that Russian ships were close to Abkhaz territorial waters in order to prevent a
situation similar to the one in South Ossetia from taking place in Abkhazia
(UNIAN, August 10, 2008).
Russian statements took on more ominous tones
later that evening after Russian troops began an assault on the Georgian city of
Gori. The Ukrayinska Pravda website quoted a spokesman for the Russian Foreign
Ministry as saying, “The actions by the Ukrainian side are contrary to
Ukrainian-Russian agreements and are hostile to the Russian Federation.”
At approximately the same time, Interfax, citing information released by
the Russian navy, reported that a Georgian military ship had been sunk by the
Russian fleet off the coast of Abkhazia.
The Ukrainian move seems to have
come as a nasty surprise for the Kremlin and the Russian General Staff, but it
is also a risky one for Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko. Throughout
Yushchenko’s presidency, Ukraine and Georgia have been exceptionally close.
They both applied for a Membership Action Plan in order to join NATO as
part of their pro-Western policies, and both were rejected. Ukrainian arms sales
to Georgia have been bitterly criticized by Russia, which claims that the arms
were being used by Georgia for “ethnic cleansing.”
As recently as
mid-July, Ukrainian, Azeri, Armenian and U.S. troops took part in a large scale
Georgian military exercise, “Immediate Response 2008,” which was planned by the
U.S. Armed Forces European Command and financed by the U.S. Defense
Department.
If the Ukrainian leadership goes through with its threat to
close off Sevastopol to Russian ships returning from the Georgian coast, a host
of problems might arise.
The political situation on the Crimean
peninsula, never favorable for Kyiv, could deteriorate further and increase
calls by Russian politicians not to renew the 1997 Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation, and Partnership by which Russia recognized the present borders of
Ukraine and which is due to expire in December 2008.
If the treaty
expires, the consequences could be severe, since this treaty, in addition to
Nikita Khrushchev’s handover of the territory to Ukraine in 1954, legalized
Ukrainian claims to the Crimea. This could pave the way for renewed calls by
Russian politicians and military leaders to annex the peninsula.
Another
problem that is sure to become aggravated is the continuing dispute between Kyiv
and Moscow over the Russian lease of the RBSF base in Sevastopol, which is due
to expire in 2017. Ukraine does not want to extend the lease, and the Russians
insist that it be prolonged.
But the main question worrying the West and
the Ukrainian leadership is that an emboldened nationalistic Russia might decide
to come to the “rescue” of the predominantly Russian population in the Crimea
just as it “came to the rescue” of the South Ossetians and Abkhaz.
Such a
scenario could conceivably force Kyiv to defend its territorial integrity and
declare war on Russia, which would have enormous repercussions around the
world.
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21
. KYIV ON GEORGIA:
DIPLOMACY AWKWARD, PARTIES DIVIDED
Support for Georgia varies
among political parties in Ukraine
COMMENTARY
& ANALYSIS: By Pavel Korduban
Eurasia Daily
Monitor, Volume 5, Issue 157
The Jamestown Foundation, Wash. D.C., Friday, August 15, 2008
Kyiv was among the first capitals to define its stance clearly in
the early stages of the conflict in South Ossetia. Deputy Foreign Minister
Kostyantyn Yeliseyev was the first high-ranking foreign official to arrive in
Georgia on a peacemaking mission.
While the West was slow in articulating its position, Kyiv hurried with
statements condemning Russia but had to backtrack somewhat later. Ukrainian
parties have been divided in their attitudes to the conflict.
Yeliseyev
said in Tbilisi that Ukraine was ready to mediate in talks between Georgia and
South Ossetia (UNIAN, August 9). He also hinted that Ukraine could provide
military aid to Georgia (Ukrainska Pravda, August 9). Later on, however,
Yeliseyev said that Kyiv did not plan to provide such aid to Georgia (UNIAN,
August 11).
The leaders of Georgia’s breakaway regions of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia accused Ukraine of direct interference. Abkhazia’s leader Sergei
Bagapsh blamed the West and Ukraine for bloodshed in South Ossetia (ITAR-TASS,
August 10). South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity said that Ukrainians were
spotted among “unknown men in NATO uniforms” in Tskhinvali (Rossia TV, August
10).
His foreign minister Murat Dzhioyev suggested that Ukrainian mercenaries
must have been fighting on Georgia’s side (www.24.ua, August 11). Ukraine denied
the allegations (Interfax-Ukraine, August 11).
On August 10, Ukraine
warned that it might take measures to prevent Russian Black Sea Fleet (RBSF)
ships sent to Abkhazia’s coast from returning to their base in Sevastopol (see
EDM, August 11).
Later on, however, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry’s spokesman Vasyl
Kyrylych admitted that the threat to ban Russian ships from returning had been
hollow. “I can say nothing about mechanisms to banish the warships from
Sevastopol. We just made public our official position,” said Kyrylych.
(Kommersant-Ukraine, August 11).
Yushchenko subsequently issued a
controversial decree apparently aimed both at saving face for Kyiv and at
avoiding open confrontation with Russia. The decree required the RBSF to agree
on any future movement of its ships with the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry. Russia
rejected the decree, pointing out that this requirement was not stipulated in
the 1997 Kyiv-Moscow accords on the RBSF (Channel 5, August 13).
Richard
Holbrooke, a former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., and Ronald Asmus, a former
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, said in an article that Ukraine would most
likely be Moscow’s next target (The Guardian, August 11). Their concern was
shared by the leader of Crimean Tatars, Mustafa Dzhemilev, who suggested that
Russia could provoke a conflict over Crimea.
Vadym Karasyov, an analyst close to the Yushchenko administration, said
that although a conflict between Russia and Ukraine was highly unlikely, Kyiv
should not have provoked Moscow by the statement on the RBSF (Blik, August
11).
In theory, Russia could use the presence of its citizens in Crimea
as a pretext for a conflict with Ukraine, like it did in South Ossetia. Apart
from the BRSF personnel stationed in Sevastopol, many Crimean residents also
reportedly have Russian citizenship. It has been claimed that Russian
citizenship has been extended to as many as 170,000 Crimean residents (1+1 TV,
August 13).
Ukrainian leaders and parties have been divided in their
attitudes to the Russia-Georgia conflict. Yushchenko went to Georgia to express
his support for Georgia’s territorial integrity (Ukrainska Pravda, August 12).
Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko did not venture any comment for several
days, which prompted the presidential office to suspect her of trading
principles for cheaper natural gas from Russia and Russia’s support in the
future presidential race (UNIAN, August 13). First Deputy Prime Minister
Oleksandr Turchynov, Tymoshenko’s right-hand man, criticized Georgia for killing
civilians in South Ossetia (UNIAN, August 12).
The left-wingers sided
with Russia. Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko condemned “the aggressive
policy” of Georgia as early as August 8. He called on the Ukrainian leadership
to stop supplying arms to Georgia. The Communists also urged a stop to military
exercises involving NATO in Ukraine (Interfax-Ukraine, August 8-11).
Hanna Herman, an unofficial spokesperson for the main opposition force, the
Party of Regions (PRU), urged the creation of an ad-hoc commission in parliament
to look into the supplies of Ukrainian arms to “hot spots,” meaning Georgia
(Ukrainska Pravda, August 9).
The PRU called on the government to refrain
from openly supporting Georgia. PRU leader Viktor Yanukovych was backed by
Moscow against Yushchenko in the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election. “We
condemn the powers-that-be for irreparably damaging Ukraine’s national interests
by unequivocally taking one side in the Georgian-Ossetian-Russian conflict,” the
PRU said in a statement (Ukrainska Pravda, August 12).
Yushchenko’s Our
Ukraine People’s Union party expressed concern over Russia’s use of the RBSF
“for tasks incompatible with the status of its deployment in Ukraine.” Although
many Ukrainians sympathize with Georgia, Kyiv has seen no mass actions in
support of Georgia.
Several pickets near the Russian Embassy have been staged by marginal
far-right parties and Georgians residing in Ukraine (Interfax-Ukraine, August
11; Inter TV, August 12). A television station reported that UNA-UNSO, a
far-right group, was recruiting young men in western Ukraine, a region where
Russia is historically disliked, to help the Georgian army (Inter, August
13).
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22
. IS UKRAINE PREPARED TO
MAINTAIN ITS TOUGH STAND AGAINST RUSSIA?
COMMENTARY & ANALYSIS, By Jan
Maksymiuk
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)
Prague, Czech Republic, Friday, August 15, 2008
As the world watches the ongoing conflict between Moscow and Tbilisi, many
eyes have turned to Ukraine -- a country which, like Georgia, has struggled to
break free of Russia's post-Soviet embrace.
Throughout the weeklong
conflict, Ukraine -- to the Kremlin's evident displeasure -- has offered strong
vocal support for Georgia in its conflict with Russia over its breakaway regions
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
On August 10, the Ukrainian Foreign
Ministry warned Moscow that Kyiv might prevent Russian Black Sea Fleet vessels
from returning to their base in the Crimean port of Sevastopol if they became
involved in combat operations against Georgia.
The Russian Foreign
Ministry criticized the warning as a "hostile" action toward Russia. But that
didn't prevent Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko -- fresh from a show of
solidarity with the Georgian leadership in Tbilisi -- from issuing an August 13
regulation requiring Russian naval ships and aircraft from the Black Sea Fleet
to request permission 72 hours ahead of any movement. The Russian side shot back
that the measure was a "new serious anti-Russian step."
No Mention Of Russia
So is
Kyiv actually ready to stand by its tough position in Moscow? While speaking at
a rally of support for Georgia and Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili in
Tbilisi on August 12, Yushchenko was more cautious in choosing his words than,
for example, his Polish counterpart Lech Kaczynski, who openly called for
counteracting Russia's renewed imperial ambitions.
Yushchenko, by
contrast, avoided any mention of Russia in his speech. "We have came here today
to tell you that Georgia is our friend. Georgians are our friends," he said.
"Today, during the most difficult times for Georgia, we want to say that you
have the right to be free and independent."
After Yushchenko came to
power in 2004, he and Saakashvili -- both brought to power by colored
revolutions -- have developed very close ties based on their common desire to
join NATO and find alternative sources of oil and gas through the GUAM (Georgia,
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) regional alliance in order to lessen both
countries' dependence on Russia.
But neither of these two strategic goals
has been achieved so far. NATO has not offered a Membership Action Plan to
either Kyiv or Tbilisi, while the GUAM grouping, which initially also included
Armenia, seems to be standing idle, if not falling apart.
Therefore, it
may be unrealistic to expect that Kyiv's resolutely formulated warnings against
Russia will be followed by equally resolute deeds.
'This Will Mean War'
Former Ukrainian
President Leonid Kravchuk told RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service that he does not
believe Ukraine could prevent Russian ships from returning to Sevastopol even if
their use in aggressive actions against Georgia was proved beyond any doubt.
In Kravchuk's opinion, Kyiv should have limited itself to a "strongly
worded" statement without including any specific threat to the Russian
Navy.
"How to block the [Russian] ships from coming in? I don't know of
any such mechanisms," Kravchuk says. "If we continue to stick to the point of
view of 'not letting them in,' this will mean a war between Ukraine and
Russia."
Former Ukrainian Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko, who is
currently the head of the parliamentary commission for national security and
defense, told RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service that there are possible ways for
Ukraine to prevent Russian ships from returning to their base in Sevastopol.
But, like Kravchuk, Hrytsenko said he does not believe that Yushchenko
would actually risk ordering a blockade of the Russian naval base in
Sevastopol.
According to Hrytsenko, the Russian-Georgian conflict over
South Ossetia and Abkhazia should spur Ukraine to conduct its relations with
Russia -- including policy issues like the scheduled deployment of the Black Sea
Fleet in Crimea until 2017 -- on a purely pragmatic basis.
Hrytsenko
argues that in accordance with the 1997 agreement on the Russian Black Sea
Fleet, Ukraine has the right to demand a market price for the lease of the naval
base in Sevastopol to Russia as of 2008.
Hrytsenko says that in order to
make Moscow pay the market price for the lease, which is estimated at $1 billion
annually, the Ukrainian government would have to repay its current debt to
Russia.
Unpalatable
Option?
"Ukraine needs to make just one step for this
purpose -- to pay off its debt to Russia. It currently stands at just $1.3
billion," Hrytsenko says. "I have proposed and will insist that the government
introduce changes to the budget in September. [Prime Minister] Yuliya
Volodymyrovna [Tymoshenko] says there is more than $20 billion [in the budget].
[It is necessary] to repay this debt to Russia immediately and make Russia -- in
negotiations, according to the signed agreements -- pay us $1 billion every
year."
But this option may also prove unpalatable to the Ukrainian
government because Moscow, if persuaded to pay $1 billion annually for the naval
base in Crimea, will most likely retaliate with increasing its gas price for
Ukraine, which currently stands at a relatively low $180 per 1,000 cubic
meters.
However, there is an even more dangerous risk in store for Kyiv
if it continues to irritate Moscow with "hostile" statements, let alone
actions.
The Russian-Ukrainian Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and
Partnership -- which both sides signed in 1997 and ratified in 1998 -- expires
in December 2008. The document, apart from establishing mutual relations on
good-neighborly terms, recognizes the current borders of Ukraine, effectively
legalizing the handover of Crimea by Russian leader Nikita Khrushchev to Ukraine
in 1954.
If the treaty is not renewed, Russian politicians could once
again raise the issue of returning the peninsula to Russia -- as they did during
the treaty ratification process in 1998.
Any potential ethnic unrest in Crimea and an ensuing military action by
Russia in connection with this issue would have incomparably graver consequences
for the region and the world than the current Russian intervention in Georgia.
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23
. AS RUSSIAN TANKS ROLL,
EUROPE REASSESSES
NEWS ANALYSIS: By Judy Dempsey, The New
York Times
New York, New York, Friday, August 15, 2008
BERLIN — The Russian tanks rumbling across parts of Georgia are forcing
a fundamental reassessment of strategic interests across Europe in a way not
considered since the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the subsequent
collapse of Communism.
For nearly two decades, European capitals in concert with Washington have
encouraged liberalization in lands once firmly under the Soviet aegis. Now, they
find themselves asking a question barely posed in all those years: How far will
or can Russia go, and what should the response be?
The answer will play out not just in the European Union, but also along
its new eastern frontier, in once obscure places like Moldova and
Azerbaijan.
Already, French leaders, acting on behalf of Europe, have firmly
told the Russians they cannot insist on the ouster of Georgia’s president,
Mikheil Saakashvili, as a precondition for a cease-fire.
Farther west, in Poland, a long-stalled negotiation on stationing parts
of a United States missile defense system was quickly wrapped up, as American
negotiators on Thursday dropped resistance to giving the Poles advanced Patriot
missiles.
The Poles, of course, had their own security in mind. “Poland wants to
be in alliances where assistance comes in the very first hours of — knock on
wood — any possible conflict,” Prime Minister Donald Tusk said.
“The reality is that international relations are changing,” said Pawel
Swieboda, director of demosEUROPA, an independent research organization based in
Warsaw. “For the first time since 1991, Russia has used military force against a
sovereign state in the post-Soviet area. The world will not be the same. A new
phenomenon is unfolding in front or our eyes: a re-emerging power that is
willing to use force to guarantee its interests. The West does not know how to
respond.”
At stake 20 years ago was whether the Kremlin, then under Mikhail
Gorbachev, would intervene militarily to stop the collapse of Communism. But Mr.
Gorbachev chose to cut Eastern Europe free as he focused — in vain — on
preventing the collapse of the Soviet Union itself.
Communist bloc lands from the Baltic States in the north to Bulgaria in
the south have since joined the European Union and NATO — a feat, despite flaws,
that in the Western view has made the continent more secure and
democratic.
But Russia never liked the expansion of NATO. In the 1990s, it was too
weak to resist; today, in the Caucasus, Russia is showing off its power and
sending an unmistakable message: Georgia, or a much larger Ukraine, will never
be allowed to join NATO.
The implications of Russia’s action reverberate well beyond that, from
the European Union’s muddled relations with a crucial energy supplier, Russia,
through Armenia and Azerbaijan in the south and east, to Ukraine and Moldova in
the west.
This region has everything that the West and Russia covet and abhor:
immense reserves of oil and gas, innumerable ethnic splits and tensions, corrupt
and authoritarian governments, pockets of territory that have become breeding
grounds or havens for Islamic fundamentalists.
As a result, the region has become the arena for competition between the
Americans and Europeans on one hand, and Russia on the other, over how to bring
these countries into their respective spheres of influence.
The European Union — as ever, slow and divided — has offered few
concrete proposals to bring the countries of what Russia calls its “near abroad”
— Belarus, Ukraine, the Caucasus and the Caspian — closer to Europe. Analysts
say the 27 member states have not been able to separate their view of Russia
from adopting a clear strategy toward the former Soviet republics on the union’s
new eastern borders.
“The Georgia crisis shows that Russia is in the process of testing how
far it can go,” said Niklas Nilsson of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute in
Stockholm. “This is part of a much bigger geopolitical game. It is time for the
Europeans to decide what kind of influence it wants in the former Soviet states.
That is the biggest strategic challenge the E.U. now faces.”
NATO, led by the United States and several Eastern European countries,
has reached out more actively. At a summit meeting in Bucharest, Romania, in
April, Georgia and Ukraine failed to get on a concrete path to membership as
they had sought, but did secure a promise of being admitted eventually.
Georgia and its supporters say that NATO membership would have
protected Georgians from Russian tanks. Western European diplomats by contrast
note with relief that Georgia is not in NATO, and thus they were not required to
come to its defense.
The newly resurgent Russians, buoyed by oil and gas wealth and the firm
leadership of Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin, have played their hand with less
hesitation.
Tomas Valasek, the Slovak-born director of foreign policy and defense
at the Center for European Reform in London, says Russia has used the ethnic and
territorial card to persuade some NATO countries that admitting Ukraine or
Georgia would prove more dangerous and unstable than keeping them out. Georgia’s
incursion Aug. 7 into South Ossetia serves both these Russian arguments, as well
as Moscow’s passionate objections to the West’s support for an independent
Kosovo.
Recognize Kosovo’s break with Serbia, Mr. Putin warned last spring, and
Russia will feel entitled to do the same with South Ossetia and Georgia’s other
breakaway enclave, Abkhazia — where Mr. Putin needs stability to realize his
cherished project of the 2014 Winter Olympics in nearby Sochi.
Ukraine, bigger than France and traditionally seen by Russians as
integral to their heritage and dominion, has been conspicuously quiet over the
past week. Senior Ukrainian officials say that the weak European Union response
on Georgia will only embolden Russia to focus even more on Ukraine, where many
inhabitants speak Russian and, particularly in the eastern half, look to Moscow,
not Kiev, for leadership.
“The crisis in Georgia has clear implications for regional security,
and of course Ukraine,” said Hryhoriy Nemyria, deputy prime minister of Ukraine,
who is responsible for European integration. “This crisis makes crystal clear
that the security vacuums that have existed in the post-Soviet space remain
dangerous.”
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24
. MYTHMAKING IN
MOSCOW
Georgia wasn't committing 'genocide,' and the
Russians aren't keeping the peace.
LEAD EDITORIAL, The Washington
Post
Washington, D.C., Saturday, August 16, 2008; Page A14
THE EVENTS of the past week in the small Caucasus republic of Georgia
will prompt animated debates about Russia and U.S.-Russian relations. We view
the events as confirmation of the dangerous challenge posed by an authoritarian
regime unwilling to recognize the sovereignty of its former imperial
possessions. Many will take issue with our interpretation, and that is as it
should be. But the debate should be based on facts.
Instead, assertions of the Russian leadership that have proved contrary to
fact continue to circulate. For example:
[1] Georgia committed genocide
against the people of South Ossetia.
This charge was initially leveled by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and has
been taken up by others, including President Dmitry Medvedev, who on Thursday
came up with the interesting formulation that South Ossetians "had lived through
a genocide."
Mr. Medvedev has referred to "thousands" killed, and Russian officials
frequently have cited 2,000 South Ossetians killed (out of a population of
70,000). They have said Georgia razed the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali.
These purported depredations are given as the main motivation for Russian
military intervention.
A researcher for Human Rights Watch who visited
Tskhinvali reported as follows: "A doctor at Tskhinvali Regional Hospital who
was on duty from the afternoon of August 7 told Human Rights Watch that between
August 6 to 12 the hospital treated 273 wounded, both military and civilians. .
. . The doctor also said that 44 bodies had been brought to the hospital since
the fighting began, of both military and civilians.
The figure reflects only those killed in the city of Tskhinvali. But the
doctor was adamant that the majority of people killed in the city had been
brought to the hospital before being buried, because the city morgue was not
functioning due to the lack of electricity in the city."
Independent journalists back up the account provided by Human Rights
Watch. The Wall Street Journal, for example, yesterday reported finding
Tskhinvali, where most of the fighting took place, mostly intact and with
"little evidence of a high death toll."
[2] Russians in Georgia are
"peacekeepers" on a humanitarian mission to protect civilians.
This formulation has alternated with repeated Russian statements,
repeatedly disproved, that Russian forces were not in Georgia at all, or were
leaving, or were about to leave.
In fact, journalists, human rights observers and others have documented
that Russian troops have ranged far into Georgia, including the city of Gori and
the port of Poti. They have razed, mined and looted Georgian army bases and
destroyed civilian houses and apartment buildings.
Militia forces under Russian control include South Ossetians and others
brought in from Russia itself -- what Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Matthew Bryza described as "the North Caucasus irregular forces that the Russian
military inexplicably encouraged to enter South Ossetia to murder, rape and
steal." They have attacked civilians in Gori and engaged in ethnic cleansing of
Georgian-populated villages in South Ossetia.
Remarkably, the Russian-allied "president" of South Ossetia acknowledged
the ethnic cleansing yesterday in an interview with the Russian newspaper
Kommersant, although he did not acknowledge the killings of Georgian civilians
that others have documented.
Eduard Kokoity said that his forces "offered them a corridor and gave the
peaceful population the chance to leave" and that "we do not intend to allow"
their return.
A war crime, yes; but at least he was honest about it.
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25
. U.S. LACKS OPTIONS TO
ACT ON TOUGH RHETORIC
Bush Administration's second-rate response to the crisis
By Andrew Ward in Washington, Financial Times
London, UK, Saturday, August 16, 2008
Condoleezza Rice had to use an unfamiliar aircraft when she flew to
Europe for emergency talks on the conflict in Georgia this week.
The Boeing 757 usually made available to the secretary of state was
being used by Dick Cheney, vice-president, for a political fundraising trip to
Colorado, forcing Ms Rice to take a smaller C-40.
To critics, the second-class transport
symbolised the Bush administration’s second-rate response to the
crisis.
“Washington was caught by surprise – both by the Georgian action and
the scale of the Russian reaction,” says Janusz Bugajski, an expert on the
region at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Stung by the criticism, the administration has adopted an increasingly
muscular and high-profile approach in recent days, including the launch of a
humanitarian mission to the war zone involving US military forces.
President George W. Bush on Friday sharpened his rhetoric, warning that
Russian “bullying and intimidation” would not be tolerated.
“Only Russia can decide whether it will now put itself back on the path
of responsible nations, or continue to pursue a policy that promises only
confrontation and isolation,” he said.
But experts warn that Washington has few effective instruments to match
its tough words. Military intervention has been ruled out, and European allies
are resisting US pressure to expel Russia from the Group of Eight industrialised
nations and bar it from the World Trade Organisation.
The most concrete US action so far has been its agreement on Thursday
to base Patriot missiles in Poland as part of a long-awaited deal to place
missile defence facilities in the country.
The deal – fiercely opposed by Moscow – had been nearing completion for
months. However, the crisis added urgency to negotiations, with Washington
rushing to signal its commitment to US allies in the region.
Experts say the biggest test of US resolve and transatlantic unity will
come at the next meeting of Nato foreign ministers in December, when eastward
expansion of the military alliance will again be up for discussion.
US efforts to put Georgia on a formal path towards Nato membership look
dead for the foreseeable future, but the Bush administration could use the
December meeting to press the case for Ukraine to be granted a membership action
plan.
Much may depend on who wins the US presidential election in
November.
Victory for John McCain, the Republican candidate and staunch advocate
of Nato expansion, might embolden the Bush administration on the issue in its
final weeks in office, while a win for Barack Obama, who has taken a more
cautious stance on Russia, could force Washington to ease off.
Criticism of US handling of the crisis and events leading up to it
divide into two camps: those who believe the Bush administration provoked Russia
by aligning itself too closely with Georgia, and those who believe it did not
stand up to Moscow strongly enough.
Both camps agree, however, that the US delivered mixed messages to
Georgia by cautioning it against military action in private while championing
its cause in public, and that Washington failed to pay sufficient attention to
the brewing crisis.
“There has been no vision or strategy to bring together the different
elements of policy towards the region and no common front with Europe,” says Mr
Bugajski, blaming the administration’s preoccupation with the Middle East and
terrorism.
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26
. TEA WITH THE FINANCIAL
TIMES: YULIA TYMOSHENKO
By Chrystia Freeland, U.S. Managing Editor of the FT
Financial Times, London, UK, Saturday, August 16 2008
Even in
Manhattan’s toniest restaurants I have never felt as frumpy as I do walking into
the elegant prewar mansion in Kiev that serves as the headquarters of the prime
minister’s political party. The long-haired, high-heeled, short-skirted young
women striding through the corridors look like the sisters of the Ukrainian
girls that crowd western catwalks, and seem to be dressed by the same
couturiers.
Yet they are easily outshone by their boss, Yulia Tymoshenko, 47, the
rabble-rousing heroine of Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, who sweeps into her
office just after 6pm wearing a still-spotless cream-coloured suit and a smile
that is just as fresh.
Tymoshenko, who began her second stint as prime minister last December,
has had a dramatic, poacher-turned-gamekeeper career, making a fortune in the
shadowy gas-trading business before going into government in the 1990s on a
corruption-fighting agenda.
Her populist appeal was burnished by the Orange Revolution, when her fiery
oratory helped rally Ukrainians behind pro-western democrat Viktor Yushchenko’s
ultimately successful bid for the presidency, in defiance of ballot-stuffing and
media control by the pro-Russian incumbent regime.
The Kiev we meet in is a world away from the frozen, euphoric and
frightening winter days of the Orange Revolution. Nor does this sunny, late
spring afternoon, which most Kievites seem to be enjoying in the city’s sidewalk
cafés, offer many portents of the anxiety that friends will report a couple of
months later, when Russia’s invasion of Georgia will have many of them wondering
if democratic Ukraine is next.
Before our meal – tea and a plate of delicious-looking pastries that
the prime minister doesn’t touch, and, so, alas, neither do I – I had made a
private vow not to make much of Tymoshenko’s looks. Her beauty is so lovingly –
even droolingly – featured in most western press accounts that I had long been
dismissive of the male reporters who seemed spellbound by their encounter with a
woman who was both pretty and powerful.
But the prime minister’s physical charm is so potent it works even on a
fellow Ukrainian matron like me. Up close she is dazzling, both delicate and
humming with the animal vitality of the charismatic politician. She opens our
conversation with the practised pol’s trick of telling me something nice about
myself, thus making me feel good while letting me know she is on top of her
game.
Her gambit: she thanks me for teaching my daughters Ukrainian. I say
they mostly hate me for it but her prime-ministerial endorsement will be useful
ammunition in my domestic linguistic wars. Ukraine itself has its own larger
battles over language.
Tymoshenko comes from Dnipropetrovsk in eastern Ukraine, an area often
assumed to be largely Russian-speaking and keen on a closer relationship to the
country known in Soviet days as their “big brother”. But, says Tymoshenko, the
linguistic character of her region is changing.
“When I joined the cabinet for the first time, I didn’t speak Ukrainian,”
she recalls. “But after working in the government for two or three months, I
simply began to speak in Ukrainian.” The switch was easy for her, and for many
urban Russophones, because “even if they Russified the city, no one ever
Russified the countryside, even after 70 years [of Soviet rule] ... When our
grandmothers came to visit us in the city, they all spoke Ukrainian and we all
understood them.”
Like her fellow Orange Revolutionaries, she thinks language is an
important marker of national identity – something you can’t take for granted in
a state that has been around for less than two decades and has declared
independence six times in the past 90 years.
While these subtle shifts between Slavic languages are a big topic in
Kiev, they’re pretty obscure if you don’t happen to be Ukrainian. So I ask
Tymoshenko about a more recognisable Ukrainian cultural symbol – her trademark
coronet of braids. At times, they’ve been a hot political issue.
Once, challenged on whether the thick blonde plaits were her own – even
Ukrainian politicians have to prove that they are “authentic” – Tymoshenko
dramatically unpinned and unbraided her hair in a Rapunzel-like display.
Sounding a little defensive, she assures me her braids are a family
tradition: her village grandmother favoured this style. But, she confides, the
real reason she wears her hair this way is simpler than that: it makes her look
good. “It is very important for us women how we look. That is an objective
fact.”
I’ve just arrived from an America greatly confused about gender and
power and beauty, and her matter-of-factness intrigues me. Yet to Tymoshenko – a
self-made millionaire, mother and the most powerful European female east of
Berlin – none of this seems complicated.
“If we are speaking about what is more important for a woman, her work or
her looks, the answer is obvious,” she tells me, looking a little perplexed that
the conversation has drifted to such self-evident matters. “She will choose to
look good, above all else, even at the cost of her work.”
Tymoshenko cheerfully talks about the differences between men and women
in a way that would shock most of us “we-are-all-equal” western feminists.
Here are a couple of my favourite assertions: women are better at taking
care of things – both kids and countries – than men: “You know how, when a
family breaks up, in most instances, the child stays with the mother? She is the
more reliable caretaker. It is the same with a country. I simply think that we
are more reliable and we are more able to give up living a normal life in order
honourably to fulfil our responsibilities.”
Male voters are inevitably sceptical about female politicians: “Every
man thinks he is more capable than any woman. This is normal. Women don’t
criticise them for this ... In fact, we support them in their sense of
superiority.”
Her sensible bottom line when I ask her if being a woman has been a
political disadvantage? “Sometimes it hurts, sometimes it helps.” From a
politician who uses her beauty as cannily as any supermodel but who also
terrifies notorious Russian oligarchs, that sounds like a fair assessment.
She strikes a less balanced note – in fact, she doesn’t even try – when
the conversation turns to Viktor Yushchenko, the Ukrainian president and her
Orange Revolution ally. An economist, talented central banker and former prime
minister, Yushchenko is as dramatic a figure as Tymoshenko. He too was known for
movie-star good looks, until an attempt to poison him on the eve of the 2004
election left him painfully disfigured.
The enmity between the two of them – the president’s supporters see her
as a dangerous populist with a poor grasp of economics and a greater commitment
to her own career than to the good of the nation – is the country’s great
political drama, and its political tragedy. Together, they faced down a corrupt
government with authoritarian leanings that was openly backed by Russian
president Vladimir Putin.
Today, despite their bickering, the Ukrainian economy is growing robustly
and the country is democratic and independent. But essential economic reforms
are more halting than they should be, especially given the growing aggression of
neighbouring Russia.
The problem, she says, is that instead of attending to today’s
problems, “others” are focused already on the “battle for the presidency in
2010”, when Ukraine will have its next election. She tells me she has publicly
disavowed any presidential ambitions for 2010 and is prepared to back Yushchenko
– if only he will let her – an assertion a little undermined by her also letting
slip: “I am certain I would be a better president.”
Tymoshenko thinks she is better at reining in the “political-oligarchic
groups”, which she sees as the biggest threat to Ukraine’s prosperity. Indeed,
she believes “corruption has become the rule, and the norm and, practically, the
law” – quite an admission from a country’s prime minister – and predicts that
one day we will discover that many “billion-dollar bribes” have been paid in
Ukraine. The oligarchs, she says proudly, “hate me ... they don’t understand me
because ... they cannot buy me or scare me”.
She can also claim credit – as she does during our conversation – for
the reprivatisation of Kryvorizhstal. This steel mill was sold off in the dying
days of Ukraine’s ancient regime to a consortium of oligarchs including the then
president’s son-in-law. Tymoshenko led the drive to sell it a second time in an
open auction.
That sale – shown live on Ukrainian television and won by the Mittals, the
London-based steel magnates – fetched $4.8bn, more than any other privatisation
in the entire former Soviet Union, a damning fact, particularly when you
consider Russia’s natural resources and the outsize personal fortunes their
sell-off created.
For all their sparring, Tymoshenko and Yushchenko have been more united
on foreign policy than many expected, with the prime minister moving towards the
robust defense of Ukraine’s national interest that the president has long
espoused. Even before Russia’s attack this week on Georgia, she has been
measured but forthright in her attitude to the Kremlin.
Tymoshenko also understands that Ukraine’s proudest accomplishment –
its democratic revolution – makes it a particular target for its authoritarian
neighbours. “They fear Ukraine as evidence that a post-Soviet country can
quickly and effectively build a rule-of-law society and a democratic society,”
she says. “And this example is very, very uncomfortable for those who would like
to keep everything undemocratic and untransparent.”
With apologies for the gloom, my parting question is a bleak one: could
Ukraine revert to authoritarianism? Despite her repeated and self-serving
complaints about the dangerous divisions within Ukraine’s democratic camp,
Tymoshenko strikes a positive note. “We are now immune to that illness,” she
says decisively.
“Today, I see Ukraine’s path, perhaps not as swift as we would like,
perhaps not as rosy or as serene, but unequivocally in the direction of the
creation of a real, European, democratic, rule-of-law state ... No one will
succeed in plundering our national identity, or humiliating us, or, God forbid,
destroying us. For all the difficulties we face, we are moving forward.” This
week, as Russian tanks rolled into Georgia, that path looks more
treacherous.
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